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+ ---
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+ tags:
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+ - security
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+ - huntr
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+ - model-file
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+ - tensorrt
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+ - detectionlayer
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+ - output-manipulation
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+ ---
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+
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+ # TensorRT DetectionLayer anchors_cnt suppression proof of concept
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+
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+ This repository contains a bounded research PoC for `TensorRT (.engine / .trt / .mytrtfile)`.
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+
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+ The security question is whether a serialized `DetectionLayer_TRT` payload can carry an attacker-controlled `anchors_cnt` value that is inconsistent with the actual anchor input tensor, while the final engine still deserializes and executes normally and silently suppresses detections.
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+
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+ ## Files
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+
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+ - `control.engine`
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+ - `anchors-cnt-4096.engine`
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+ - `verify_remote_poc.py`
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+ - `requirements.txt`
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+
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+ ## What the files demonstrate
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+
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+ Control:
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+
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+ ```text
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+ positive_cls -> [0.5]
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+ mixed_bbox -> [0.11951626092195511]
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+ ```
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+
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+ Malicious serialized `anchors_cnt = 4096`:
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+
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+ ```text
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+ positive_cls -> [0.0]
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+ mixed_bbox -> [0.0]
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+ ```
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+
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+ The same suppression was also observed for `anchors_cnt = 128`.
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+ ## Verify the public HF artifacts
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+
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+ After unauthenticated download, run:
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+
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+ ```bash
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+ python verify_remote_poc.py
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+ ```
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+
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+ Expected result:
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+
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+ - all engines deserialize successfully
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+ - all engines execute successfully
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+ - control output is non-zero on detection presets
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+ - the `anchors-cnt-4096.engine` output suppresses those detections to zero
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+ - `semantic_suppression_observed` is `true`