Daily Papers

Training generalist agents capable of adapting to diverse scenarios requires interactive environments for self-exploration. However, interactive environments remain critically scarce, and existing synthesis methods suffer from significant limitations regarding environmental diversity and scalability. To address these challenges, we introduce ScaleEnv, a framework that constructs fully interactive environments and verifiable tasks entirely from scratch. Specifically, ScaleEnv ensures environment reliability through procedural testing, and guarantees task completeness and solvability via tool dependency graph expansion and executable action verification. By enabling agents to learn through exploration within ScaleEnv, we demonstrate significant performance improvements on unseen, multi-turn tool-use benchmarks such as τ^2-Bench and VitaBench, highlighting strong generalization capabilities. Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between increasing number of domains and model generalization performance, providing empirical evidence that scaling environmental diversity is critical for robust agent learning.

Learning long-horizon embodied behaviors from synthetic data remains challenging because generated scenes are often physically implausible, language-driven programs frequently "succeed" without satisfying task semantics, and high-level instructions require grounding into executable action sequences. To address these limitations, we introduce V-CAGE, a closed-loop framework for generating robust, semantically aligned manipulation datasets at scale. First, we propose a context-aware instantiation mechanism that enforces geometric consistency during scene synthesis. By dynamically maintaining a map of prohibited spatial areas as objects are placed, our system prevents interpenetration and ensures reachable, conflict-free configurations in cluttered environments. Second, to bridge the gap between abstract intent and low-level control, we employ a hierarchical instruction decomposition module. This decomposes high-level goals (e.g., "get ready for work") into compositional action primitives, facilitating coherent long-horizon planning. Crucially, we enforce semantic correctness through a VLM-based verification loop. Acting as a visual critic, the VLM performs rigorous rejection sampling after each subtask, filtering out "silent failures" where code executes but fails to achieve the visual goal. Experiments demonstrate that V-CAGE yields datasets with superior physical and semantic fidelity, significantly boosting the success rate and generalization of downstream policies compared to non-verified baselines.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promise as robotic planners but often struggle with long-horizon and complex tasks, especially in specialized environments requiring external knowledge. While hierarchical planning and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) address some of these challenges, they remain insufficient on their own and a deeper integration is required for achieving more reliable systems. To this end, we propose a neuro-symbolic approach that enhances LLMs-based planners with Knowledge Graph-based RAG for hierarchical plan generation. This method decomposes complex tasks into manageable subtasks, further expanded into executable atomic action sequences. To ensure formal correctness and proper decomposition, we integrate a Symbolic Validator, which also functions as a failure detector by aligning expected and observed world states. Our evaluation against baseline methods demonstrates the consistent significant advantages of integrating hierarchical planning, symbolic verification, and RAG across tasks of varying complexity and different LLMs. Additionally, our experimental setup and novel metrics not only validate our approach for complex planning but also serve as a tool for assessing LLMs' reasoning and compositional capabilities.

Autonomous agents powered by foundation models have seen widespread adoption across various real-world applications. However, they remain highly vulnerable to malicious instructions and attacks, which can result in severe consequences such as privacy breaches and financial losses. More critically, existing guardrails for LLMs are not applicable due to the complex and dynamic nature of agents. To tackle these challenges, we propose ShieldAgent, the first guardrail agent designed to enforce explicit safety policy compliance for the action trajectory of other protected agents through logical reasoning. Specifically, ShieldAgent first constructs a safety policy model by extracting verifiable rules from policy documents and structuring them into a set of action-based probabilistic rule circuits. Given the action trajectory of the protected agent, ShieldAgent retrieves relevant rule circuits and generates a shielding plan, leveraging its comprehensive tool library and executable code for formal verification. In addition, given the lack of guardrail benchmarks for agents, we introduce ShieldAgent-Bench, a dataset with 3K safety-related pairs of agent instructions and action trajectories, collected via SOTA attacks across 6 web environments and 7 risk categories. Experiments show that ShieldAgent achieves SOTA on ShieldAgent-Bench and three existing benchmarks, outperforming prior methods by 11.3% on average with a high recall of 90.1%. Additionally, ShieldAgent reduces API queries by 64.7% and inference time by 58.2%, demonstrating its high precision and efficiency in safeguarding agents.

Completing Long-Horizon (LH) tasks in open-ended worlds is an important yet difficult problem for embodied agents. Existing approaches suffer from two key challenges: (1) they heavily rely on experiences obtained from human-created data or curricula, failing to autonomously update and select multimodal experiences, and (2) they may encounter catastrophic forgetting issues when faced with new tasks, failing to autonomously update world knowledge. To solve these challenges, this paper presents {\bf EvolvingAgent}, a curriculum self-evolving agent with a continual World Model (WM), which can autonomously complete various LH tasks across environments through self-planning, self-control, and self-reflection, without human intervention. Specifically, EvolvingAgent contains three modules, i.e., i) the experience-driven task planner, which uses an LLM along with multimodal experiences to convert LH tasks into executable sub-tasks; ii) the WM-guided action controller, which leverages WM to generate low-level actions and incorporates a self-verification mechanism to update multimodal experiences; iii) the Curriculum Learning (CL) -based reflector, which implements a two-stage CL algorithm to select multimodal experiences for task-adaptive WM updates. By building a planner-controller-reflector closed-loop dynamic, the continual WM for EvolvingAgent can autonomously update multimodal experiences and world knowledge. We conducted extensive experiments on Minecraft, compared with existing methods, EvolvingAgent can improve 111.74{\%} average success rate, reduce more than 6x ineffective actions, and generalize to the Atari environment with human-level performance.

Geometric Problem Solving (GPS) poses a unique challenge for Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), requiring not only the joint interpretation of text and diagrams but also iterative visuospatial reasoning. While existing approaches process diagrams as static images, they lack the capacity for dynamic manipulation - a core aspect of human geometric reasoning involving auxiliary line construction and affine transformations. We present GeoSketch, a neural-symbolic framework that recasts geometric reasoning as an interactive perception-reasoning-action loop. GeoSketch integrates: (1) a Perception module that abstracts diagrams into structured logic forms, (2) a Symbolic Reasoning module that applies geometric theorems to decide the next deductive step, and (3) a Sketch Action module that executes operations such as drawing auxiliary lines or applying transformations, thereby updating the diagram in a closed loop. To train this agent, we develop a two-stage pipeline: supervised fine-tuning on 2,000 symbolic-curated trajectories followed by reinforcement learning with dense, symbolic rewards to enhance robustness and strategic exploration. To evaluate this paradigm, we introduce the GeoSketch Benchmark, a high-quality set of 390 geometry problems requiring auxiliary construction or affine transformations. Experiments on strong MLLM baselines demonstrate that GeoSketch significantly improves stepwise reasoning accuracy and problem-solving success over static perception methods. By unifying hierarchical decision-making, executable visual actions, and symbolic verification, GeoSketch advances multimodal reasoning from static interpretation to dynamic, verifiable interaction, establishing a new foundation for solving complex visuospatial problems.

Code LLMs still struggle with code execution reasoning, especially in smaller models. Existing methods rely on supervised fine-tuning (SFT) with teacher-generated explanations, primarily in two forms: (1) input-output (I/O) prediction chains and (2) natural-language descriptions of execution traces. However, intermediate execution steps cannot be explicitly verified during SFT, so the training objective can reduce to merely matching teacher explanations. Moreover, training data is typically collected without explicit control over task difficulty. We introduce ExecVerify, which goes beyond text imitation by incorporating verifiable white-box rewards derived from execution traces, including next-statement prediction and variable value/type prediction. Our work first builds a dataset with multiple difficulty levels via constraint-based program synthesis. Then, we apply reinforcement learning (RL) to reward correct answers about both intermediate execution steps and final outputs, aligning the training objective with semantic correctness at each execution step. Finally, we adopt a two-stage training pipeline that first enhances execution reasoning and then transfers to code generation. Experiments demonstrate that a 7B model trained with ExecVerify achieves performance comparable to 32B models on code reasoning benchmarks and improves pass@1 by up to 5.9\% on code generation tasks over strong post-training baselines.

The performance of autonomous Web GUI agents heavily relies on the quality and quantity of their training data. However, a fundamental bottleneck persists: collecting interaction trajectories from real-world websites is expensive and difficult to verify. The underlying state transitions are hidden, leading to reliance on inconsistent and costly external verifiers to evaluate step-level correctness. To address this, we propose AutoWebWorld, a novel framework for synthesizing controllable and verifiable web environments by modeling them as Finite State Machines (FSMs) and use coding agents to translate FSMs into interactive websites. Unlike real websites, where state transitions are implicit, AutoWebWorld explicitly defines all states, actions, and transition rules. This enables programmatic verification: action correctness is checked against predefined rules, and task success is confirmed by reaching a goal state in the FSM graph. AutoWebWorld enables a fully automated search-and-verify pipeline, generating over 11,663 verified trajectories from 29 diverse web environments at only $0.04 per trajectory. Training on this synthetic data significantly boosts real-world performance. Our 7B Web GUI agent outperforms all baselines within 15 steps on WebVoyager. Furthermore, we observe a clear scaling law: as the synthetic data volume increases, performance on WebVoyager and Online-Mind2Web consistently improves.

Large language models can generate fluent answers that are unfaithful to the provided context, while many safeguards rely on external verification or a separate judge after generation. We introduce internal flow signatures that audit decision formation from depthwise dynamics at a fixed inter-block monitoring boundary. The method stabilizes token-wise motion via bias-centered monitoring, then summarizes trajectories in compact moving readout-aligned subspaces constructed from the top token and its close competitors within each depth window. Neighboring window frames are aligned by an orthogonal transport, yielding depth-comparable transported step lengths, turning angles, and subspace drift summaries that are invariant to within-window basis choices. A lightweight GRU validator trained on these signatures performs self-checking without modifying the base model. Beyond detection, the validator localizes a culprit depth event and enables a targeted refinement: the model rolls back to the culprit token and clamps an abnormal transported step at the identified block while preserving the orthogonal residual. The resulting pipeline provides actionable localization and low-overhead self-checking from internal decision dynamics. Code is available at github.com/EavnJeong/Internal-Flow-Signatures-for-Self-Checking-and-Refinement-in-LLMs.

End-to-end GUI agents for real desktop environments require large amounts of high-quality interaction data, yet collecting human demonstrations is expensive and existing synthetic pipelines often suffer from limited task diversity or noisy, goal-drifting trajectories. We present a trajectory expansion framework Anchor that bootstraps scalable desktop supervision from a small set of verified seed demonstrations. Starting from each seed, we identify branch points that correspond to meaningful state changes and propose new, state-grounded task variants conditioned on the current GUI context. An executing agent then follows the proposed instructions to generate new trajectories, while a verifier enforces task completion via state-aware checks and trajectory-level consistency. To improve supervision quality, we further apply task-conditioned step-level filtering to remove ungrounded actions and denoise post-branch segments to maintain coherent intent. Experiments on standard desktop benchmarks, OSWorld and WindowsAgentArena, show that models fine-tuned on our expanded corpus achieve consistent improvements over zero-shot agents and representative synthesis baselines, and generalize across applications and operating systems.

The long-standing vision of general-purpose robots hinges on their ability to understand and act upon natural language instructions. Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have made remarkable progress toward this goal, yet their generated actions can still misalign with the given instructions. In this paper, we investigate test-time verification as a means to shrink the "intention-action gap." We first characterize the test-time scaling laws for embodied instruction following and demonstrate that jointly scaling the number of rephrased instructions and generated actions greatly increases test-time sample diversity, often recovering correct actions more efficiently than scaling each dimension independently. To capitalize on these scaling laws, we present CoVer, a contrastive verifier for vision-language-action alignment, and show that our architecture scales gracefully with additional computational resources and data. We then introduce CoVer-VLA, a hierarchical test-time verification pipeline using the trained verifier. At deployment, our framework precomputes a diverse set of rephrased instructions from a Vision-Language-Model (VLM), repeatedly generates action candidates for each instruction, and then uses the verifier to select the optimal high-level prompt and low-level action chunks. Compared to scaling policy pre-training on the same data, our verification approach yields 22% gains in-distribution and 13% out-of-distribution on the SIMPLER benchmark, with a further 45% improvement in real-world experiments. On the PolaRiS benchmark, CoVer-VLA achieves 14% gains in task progress and 9% in success rate.

Large language models generate plausible code but cannot verify correctness. Existing multi-agent systems simulate execution or leave verification optional. We introduce execution-grounded verification as a first-class principle: every code change must survive sandboxed execution before propagation. We instantiate this principle in AGENTFORGE, a multi-agent framework where Planner, Coder, Tester, Debugger, and Critic agents coordinate through shared memory and a mandatory Docker sandbox. We formalize software engineering with LLMs as an iterative decision process over repository states, where execution feedback provides a stronger supervision signal than next-token likelihood. AGENTFORGE achieves 40.0\% resolution on SWE-BENCH Lite, outperforming single-agent baselines by 26--28 points. Ablations confirm that execution feedback and role decomposition each independently drive performance. The framework is open-source at https://github.com/raja21068/AutoCodeAI.

The deployment of autonomous AI agents in sensitive domains, such as healthcare, introduces critical risks to safety, security, and privacy. These agents may deviate from user objectives, violate data handling policies, or be compromised by adversarial attacks. Mitigating these dangers necessitates a mechanism to formally guarantee that an agent's actions adhere to predefined safety constraints, a challenge that existing systems do not fully address. We introduce VeriGuard, a novel framework that provides formal safety guarantees for LLM-based agents through a dual-stage architecture designed for robust and verifiable correctness. The initial offline stage involves a comprehensive validation process. It begins by clarifying user intent to establish precise safety specifications. VeriGuard then synthesizes a behavioral policy and subjects it to both testing and formal verification to prove its compliance with these specifications. This iterative process refines the policy until it is deemed correct. Subsequently, the second stage provides online action monitoring, where VeriGuard operates as a runtime monitor to validate each proposed agent action against the pre-verified policy before execution. This separation of the exhaustive offline validation from the lightweight online monitoring allows formal guarantees to be practically applied, providing a robust safeguard that substantially improves the trustworthiness of LLM agents.

Agentic reinforcement learning (RL) holds great promise for the development of autonomous agents under complex GUI tasks, but its scalability remains severely hampered by the verification of task completion. Existing task verification is treated as a passive, post-hoc process: a verifier (i.e., rule-based scoring script, reward or critic model, and LLM-as-a-Judge) analyzes the agent's entire interaction trajectory to determine if the agent succeeds. Such processing of verbose context that contains irrelevant, noisy history poses challenges to the verification protocols and therefore leads to prohibitive cost and low reliability. To overcome this bottleneck, we propose SmartSnap, a paradigm shift from this passive, post-hoc verification to proactive, in-situ self-verification by the agent itself. We introduce the Self-Verifying Agent, a new type of agent designed with dual missions: to not only complete a task but also to prove its accomplishment with curated snapshot evidences. Guided by our proposed 3C Principles (Completeness, Conciseness, and Creativity), the agent leverages its accessibility to the online environment to perform self-verification on a minimal, decisive set of snapshots. Such evidences are provided as the sole materials for a general LLM-as-a-Judge verifier to determine their validity and relevance. Experiments on mobile tasks across model families and scales demonstrate that our SmartSnap paradigm allows training LLM-driven agents in a scalable manner, bringing performance gains up to 26.08% and 16.66% respectively to 8B and 30B models. The synergizing between solution finding and evidence seeking facilitates the cultivation of efficient, self-verifying agents with competitive performance against DeepSeek V3.1 and Qwen3-235B-A22B.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are evolving beyond their classical role of providing information within dialogue systems to actively engaging with tools and performing actions on real-world applications and services. Today, humans verify the correctness and appropriateness of the LLM-generated outputs (e.g., code, functions, or actions) before putting them into real-world execution. This poses significant challenges as code comprehension is well known to be notoriously difficult. In this paper, we study how humans can efficiently collaborate with, delegate to, and supervise autonomous LLMs in the future. We argue that in many cases, "post-facto validation" - verifying the correctness of a proposed action after seeing the output - is much easier than the aforementioned "pre-facto validation" setting. The core concept behind enabling a post-facto validation system is the integration of an intuitive undo feature, and establishing a damage confinement for the LLM-generated actions as effective strategies to mitigate the associated risks. Using this, a human can now either revert the effect of an LLM-generated output or be confident that the potential risk is bounded. We believe this is critical to unlock the potential for LLM agents to interact with applications and services with limited (post-facto) human involvement. We describe the design and implementation of our open-source runtime for executing LLM actions, Gorilla Execution Engine (GoEX), and present open research questions towards realizing the goal of LLMs and applications interacting with each other with minimal human supervision. We release GoEX at https://github.com/ShishirPatil/gorilla/.

Recently, Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have demonstrated strong performance on a range of robotic tasks. These models rely on multimodal inputs, with language instructions playing a crucial role -- not only in predicting actions, but also in robustly interpreting user intent, even when the requests are impossible to fulfill. In this work, we investigate how VLAs can recognize, interpret, and respond to false-premise instructions: natural language commands that reference objects or conditions absent from the environment. We propose Instruct-Verify-and-Act (IVA), a unified framework that (i) detects when an instruction cannot be executed due to a false premise, (ii) engages in language-based clarification or correction, and (iii) grounds plausible alternatives in perception and action. Towards this end, we construct a large-scale instruction tuning setup with structured language prompts and train a VLA model capable of handling both accurate and erroneous requests. Our approach leverages a contextually augmented, semi-synthetic dataset containing paired positive and false-premise instructions, enabling robust detection and natural language correction. Our experiments show that IVA improves false premise detection accuracy by 97.56% over baselines, while increasing successful responses in false-premise scenarios by 50.78%.

Automated vulnerability reproduction from CVE descriptions requires generating executable Proof-of-Concept (PoC) exploits and validating them in target environments. This process is critical in software security research and practice, yet remains time-consuming and demands specialized expertise when performed manually. While LLM agents show promise for automating this task, existing approaches often conflate exploring attack directions with fixing implementation details, which leads to unproductive debugging loops when reproduction fails. To address this, we propose CVE2PoC, an LLM-based dual-loop agent framework following a plan-execute-evaluate paradigm. The Strategic Planner analyzes vulnerability semantics and target code to produce structured attack plans. The Tactical Executor generates PoC code and validates it through progressive verification. The Adaptive Refiner evaluates execution results and routes failures to different loops: the Tactical Loop for code-level refinement, while the Strategic Loop for attack strategy replanning. This dual-loop design enables the framework to escape ineffective debugging by matching remediation to failure type. Evaluation on two benchmarks covering 617 real-world vulnerabilities demonstrates that CVE2PoC achieves 82.9% and 54.3% reproduction success rates on SecBench.js and PatchEval, respectively, outperforming the best baseline by 11.3% and 20.4%. Human evaluation confirms that generated PoCs achieve comparable code quality to human-written exploits in readability and reusability.

Autonomous agent systems increasingly trigger real-world side effects: deploying infrastructure, modifying databases, moving money, and executing workflows. Yet most agent stacks provide no mandatory execution checkpoint where organizations can deterministically permit, deny, or defer an action before it changes reality. This paper introduces Faramesh, a protocol-agnostic execution control plane that enforces execution-time authorization for agent-driven actions via a non-bypassable Action Authorization Boundary (AAB). Faramesh canonicalizes agent intent into a Canonical Action Representation (CAR), evaluates actions deterministically against policy and state, and issues a decision artifact (PERMIT/DEFER/DENY) that executors must validate prior to execution. The system is designed to be framework- and model-agnostic, supports multi-agent and multi-tenant deployments, and remains independent of transport protocols (e.g., MCP). Faramesh further provides decision-centric, append-only provenance logging keyed by canonical action hashes, enabling auditability, verification, and deterministic replay without re-running agent reasoning. We show how these primitives yield enforceable, predictable governance for autonomous execution while avoiding hidden coupling to orchestration layers or observability-only approaches.

Tool-augmented LLM agents raise new security risks: tool executions can introduce runtime-only behaviors, including prompt injection and unintended exposure of external inputs (e.g., environment secrets or local files). While existing scanners often focus on static artifacts, analyzing runtime behavior is challenging because directly executing untrusted tools can itself be dangerous. We present MCP-SandboxScan, a lightweight framework motivated by the Model Context Protocol (MCP) that safely executes untrusted tools inside a WebAssembly/WASI sandbox and produces auditable reports of external-to-sink exposures. Our prototype (i) extracts LLM-relevant sinks from runtime outputs (prompt/messages and structured tool-return fields), (ii) instantiates external-input candidates from environment values, mounted file contents, and output-surfaced HTTP fetch intents, and (iii) links sources to sinks via snippet-based substring matching. Case studies on three representative tools show that MCP-SandboxScan can surface provenance evidence when external inputs appear in prompt/messages or tool-return payloads, and can expose filesystem capability violations as runtime evidence. We further compare against a lightweight static string-signature baseline and use a micro-benchmark to characterize false negatives under transformations and false positives from short-token collisions.

Autonomous GUI agents face two fundamental challenges: early stopping, where agents prematurely declare success without verifiable evidence, and repetitive loops, where agents cycle through the same failing actions without recovery. We present VLAA-GUI, a modular GUI agentic framework built around three integrated components that guide the system on when to Stop, Recover, and Search. First, a mandatory Completeness Verifier enforces UI-observable success criteria and verification at every finish step -- with an agent-level verifier that cross-examines completion claims with decision rules, rejecting those lacking direct visual evidence. Second, a mandatory Loop Breaker provides multi-tier filtering: switching interaction mode after repeated failures, forcing strategy changes after persistent screen-state recurrence, and binding reflection signals to strategy shifts. Third, an on-demand Search Agent searches online for unfamiliar workflows by directly querying a capable LLM with search ability, returning results as plain text. We additionally integrate a Coding Agent for code-intensive actions and a Grounding Agent for precise action grounding, both invoked on demand when required. We evaluate VLAA-GUI across five top-tier backbones, including Opus 4.5, 4.6 and Gemini 3.1 Pro, on two benchmarks with Linux and Windows tasks, achieving top performance on both (77.5% on OSWorld and 61.0% on WindowsAgentArena). Notably, three of the five backbones surpass human performance (72.4%) on OSWorld in a single pass. Ablation studies show that all three proposed components consistently improve a strong backbone, while a weaker backbone benefits more from these tools when the step budget is sufficient. Further analysis also shows that the Loop Breaker nearly halves wasted steps for loop-prone models.

We address the problem of runtime trajectory anomaly detection, a critical capability for enabling trustworthy LLM agents. Current safety measures predominantly focus on static input/output filtering. However, we argue that ensuring LLM agents reliability requires auditing the intermediate execution process. In this work, we formulate the task of Trajectory Anomaly Detection. The goal is not merely detection, but precise error localization. This capability is essential for enabling efficient rollback-and-retry. To achieve this, we construct TrajBench, a dataset synthesized via a perturb-and-complete strategy to cover diverse procedural anomalies. Using this benchmark, we investigate the capability of models in process supervision. We observe that general-purpose LLMs, even with zero-shot prompting, struggle to identify and localize these anomalies. This reveals that generalized capabilities do not automatically translate to process reliability. To address this, we propose TrajAD, a specialized verifier trained with fine-grained process supervision. Our approach outperforms baselines, demonstrating that specialized supervision is essential for building trustworthy agents.

AI coding agents are increasingly used to write real-world software, but ensuring that their outputs are correct remains a fundamental challenge. Formal verification offers a promising path: an agent generates code together with a machine-checked proof, guaranteeing that the code satisfies a formal specification. However, there is no guarantee that the formal spec itself matches the user's intent. In this work, we study specification autoformalization: whether LLM agents can translate informal programming problems into faithful formal specifications. We introduce Verus-SpecBench, a benchmark of 581 spec-writing tasks derived from Codeforces problems targeting Verus, a verifier for Rust, and Verus-SpecGym, an agentic environment in which models interact with Verus, bash, & the filesystem to develop these specs. The central challenge is evaluation: expert-written reference specs are expensive to write, & LLM judges can miss subtle mistakes. We address this by (a) extending Verus's exec_spec mechanism so that generated specs can be executed as Rust code, & (b) testing them against official Codeforces tests & adversarial cases extracted from Codeforces "hacks", which are edge cases written by competitors to break incorrect solutions. On Verus-SpecBench, the strongest model, Gemini 3.1 Pro, solves 77.8% of tasks, other frontier models solve 51.1--57.8% & OSS models reach only 21.5--25.5%. Our analysis of failure modes shows that model-generated specs can omit important input assumptions, accept incorrect outputs, & reject valid ones. We also find that LLM-as-a-judge evaluation misses 26% of the failures our evaluator catches. Overall, our results suggest that spec autoformalization is within reach for frontier agents but remains brittle even on problems where they can already generate correct code. The code, data, & logs can be found at https://github.com/formal-verif-is-cool/verus-spec-gym

The main issue with most evaluation schemes today is their "static" nature: the same problems are reused repeatedly, allowing for memorization, format exploitation, and eventual saturation. To measure genuine AI progress, we need evaluation that is robust by construction, not by post-hoc detection. In response, we propose VeRA (Verified Reasoning Data Augmentation), a framework that converts benchmark problems into executable specifications, comprising (i) a natural language template with placeholder slots, (ii) a coherent generator that samples valid configurations, and (iii) a deterministic verifier that validates parameters and calculates the corresponding correct answers for each configuration. From a single seed problem, VeRA automatically creates unlimited verified variants with reliable labels at near-zero marginal cost without human involvement. VeRA operates in two complementary modes. VeRA-E (equivalent) rewrites problems while keeping the underlying logic intact, useful for detecting memorization versus genuine reasoning. VeRA-H (hardened) systematically increases complexity while remaining verifiable, enabling reliable creation and labelling of fresh difficult tasks at the boundary of intelligence. Evaluating 16 frontier models with VeRA, we find: (i) VeRA-E improves evaluation quality and reveals contamination patterns. (ii) VeRA-H enables human-free generation of hard tasks with reliable labels. (iii) VeRA establishes verified benchmarks as a general paradigm. VeRA reconceptualizes benchmarks from static objects used until exhausted, to executable specifications generating fresh, verified instances on demand, enhancing robustness and cost-effectiveness for evaluation. With VeRA, we envision that evaluation in any verifiable domain can scale indefinitely without sacrificing label integrity. To stimulate future research, we have open-sourced all code and datasets.

Tool-calling agents are increasingly deployed in real-world customer-facing workflows. Yet most studies on tool-calling agents focus on idealized settings with general, fixed, and well-specified tasks. In real-world applications, user requests are often (1) ambiguous, (2) changing over time, or (3) infeasible due to policy constraints, and training and evaluation data that cover these diverse, complex interaction patterns remain under-represented. To bridge the gap, we present Trajectory2Task, a verifiable data generation pipeline for studying tool use at scale under three realistic user scenarios: ambiguous intent, changing intent, and infeasible intents. The pipeline first conducts multi-turn exploration to produce valid tool-call trajectories. It then converts these trajectories into user-facing tasks with controlled intent adaptations. This process yields verifiable task that support closed-loop evaluation and training. We benchmark seven state-of-the-art LLMs on the generated complex user scenario tasks and observe frequent failures. Finally, using successful trajectories obtained from task rollouts, we fine-tune lightweight LLMs and find consistent improvements across all three conditions, along with better generalization to unseen tool-use domains, indicating stronger general tool-calling ability.

Graphical user interface (GUI) agents have advanced rapidly but still struggle with complex tasks involving novel UI elements, long-horizon actions, and personalized trajectories. In this work, we introduce Instruction Agent, a GUI agent that leverages expert demonstrations to solve such tasks, enabling completion of otherwise difficult workflows. Given a single demonstration, the agent extracts step-by-step instructions and executes them by strictly following the trajectory intended by the user, which avoids making mistakes during execution. The agent leverages the verifier and backtracker modules further to improve robustness. Both modules are critical to understand the current outcome from each action and handle unexpected interruptions(such as pop-up windows) during execution. Our experiments show that Instruction Agent achieves a 60% success rate on a set of tasks in OSWorld that all top-ranked agents failed to complete. The Instruction Agent offers a practical and extensible framework, bridging the gap between current GUI agents and reliable real-world GUI task automation.

Verifying the success of computer use agent (CUA) trajectories is a critical challenge: without reliable verification, neither evaluation nor training signal can be trusted. In this paper, we present lessons learned from building a best-in-class verifier for web tasks we call the Universal Verifier. We design the Universal Verifier around four key principles: 1) constructing rubrics with meaningful, non-overlapping criteria to reduce noise; 2) separating process and outcome rewards that yield complementary signals, capturing cases where an agent follows the right steps but gets blocked or succeeds through an unexpected path; 3) distinguishing between controllable and uncontrollable failures scored via a cascading-error-free strategy for finer-grained failure understanding; and 4) a divide-and-conquer context management scheme that attends to all screenshots in a trajectory, improving reliability on longer task horizons. We validate these findings on CUAVerifierBench, a new set of CUA trajectories with both process and outcome human labels, showing that our Universal Verifier agrees with humans as often as humans agree with each other. We report a reduction in false positive rates to near zero compared to baselines like WebVoyager (geq 45\%) and WebJudge (geq 22\%). We emphasize that these gains stem from the cumulative effect of the design choices above. We also find that an auto-research agent achieves 70\% of expert quality in 5\% of the time, but fails to discover all strategies required to replicate the Universal Verifier. We open-source our Universal Verifier system along with CUAVerifierBench; available at https://github.com/microsoft/fara.

In Agentic AI, Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in the orchestration layer to coordinate multiple agents and to interact with external services, retrieval components, and shared memory. In this setting, failures are not limited to incorrect final outputs. They also arise from long-horizon interaction, stochastic decisions, and external side effects (such as API calls, database writes, and message sends). Common failures include non-termination, role drift, propagation of unsupported claims, and attacks via untrusted context or external channels. This paper presents an assurance framework for such Agentic AI systems. Executions are instrumented as Message-Action Traces (MAT) with explicit step and trace contracts. Contracts provide machine-checkable verdicts, localize the first violating step, and support deterministic replay. The framework includes stress testing, formulated as a budgeted counterexample search over bounded perturbations. It also supports structured fault injection at service, retrieval, and memory boundaries to assess containment under realistic operational faults and degraded conditions. Finally, governance is treated as a runtime component, enforcing per-agent capability limits and action mediation (allow, rewrite, block) at the language-to-action boundary. To support comparative evaluations across stochastic seeds, models, and orchestration configurations, the paper defines trace-based metrics for task success, termination reliability, contract compliance, factuality indicators, containment rate, and governance outcome distributions. More broadly, the framework is intended as a common abstraction to support testing and evaluation of multi-agent LLM systems, and to facilitate reproducible comparison across orchestration designs and configurations.

Command line interface (CLI) agents are emerging as a practical paradigm for agent-computer interaction over evolving filesystems, executable command line programs, and online execution feedback. Recent work has used reinforcement learning (RL) to learn these interaction abilities from verifiable task feedback, yet few methods exploit the native structured attributes of CLI actions as learning signals. Beyond this underused action structure, CLI learning also couples two bottlenecks for coding agents. First, the agent must identify task-relevant evidence in a large codebase from partial observations. Second, sparse terminal rewards must be assigned to the actions that shape a long multi-turn trajectory. We study these bottlenecks through shell-driven information extraction and file editing tasks. For selective observation, we introduce σ-Reveal, an inference-time mechanism that selects token-budgeted context for the same CLI. For credit assignment, we propose Action Advantage Assignment (A^3), a native agentic RL method that preserves the algorithmic complexity of standard agentic RL. A^3 constructs turn-level advantages from episode-level relative feedback, abstract syntax tree (AST) based action sub-chain residuals, and tree-level trajectory margins. To further evaluate this problem setting, we construct ShellOps, a verifiable dataset suite covering CLI tasks in repository environments.

Personal AI agents like OpenClaw run with elevated privileges on users' local machines, where a single successful prompt injection can leak credentials, redirect financial transactions, or destroy files. This threat goes well beyond conventional text-level jailbreaks, yet existing safety evaluations fall short: most test models in isolated chat settings, rely on synthetic environments, and do not account for how the agent framework itself shapes safety outcomes. We introduce CLAWSAFETY, a benchmark of 120 adversarial test scenarios organized along three dimensions (harm domain, attack vector, and harmful action type) and grounded in realistic, high-privilege professional workspaces spanning software engineering, finance, healthcare, law, and DevOps. Each test case embeds adversarial content in one of three channels the agent encounters during normal work: workspace skill files, emails from trusted senders, and web pages. We evaluate five frontier LLMs as agent backbones, running 2,520 sandboxed trials across all configurations. Attack success rates (ASR) range from 40\% to 75\% across models and vary sharply by injection vector, with skill instructions (highest trust) consistently more dangerous than email or web content. Action-trace analysis reveals that the strongest model maintains hard boundaries against credential forwarding and destructive actions, while weaker models permit both. Cross-scaffold experiments on three agent frameworks further demonstrate that safety is not determined by the backbone model alone but depends on the full deployment stack, calling for safety evaluation that treats model and framework as joint variables. Code and data will be available at: https://weibowen555.github.io/ClawSafety/.

The deployment of autonomous AI agents capable of executing commercial transactions has motivated the adoption of mandate-based payment authorization protocols, including the Universal Commerce Protocol (UCP) and the Agent Payments Protocol (AP2). These protocols replace interactive, session-based authorization with cryptographically issued mandates, enabling asynchronous and autonomous execution. While AP2 provides specification-level guarantees through signature verification, explicit binding, and expiration semantics, real-world agentic execution introduces runtime behaviors such as retries, concurrency, and orchestration that challenge implicit assumptions about mandate usage. In this work, we present a security analysis of the AP2 mandate lifecycle and identify enforcement gaps that arise during runtime in agent-based payment systems. We propose a zero-trust runtime verification framework that enforces explicit context binding and consume-once mandate semantics using dynamically generated, time-bound nonces, ensuring that authorization decisions are evaluated at execution time rather than assumed from static issuance properties. Through simulation-based evaluation under high concurrency, we show that context-aware binding and consume-once enforcement address distinct and complementary attack classes, and that both are required to prevent replay and context-redirect attacks. The proposed framework mitigates all evaluated attacks while maintaining stable verification latency of approximately 3.8~ms at throughput levels up to 10{,}000 transactions per second. We further demonstrate that the required runtime state is bounded by peak concurrency rather than cumulative transaction history, indicating that robust runtime security for agentic payment execution can be achieved with minimal and predictable overhead.

In this paper we present a novel solution that combines the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) with Formal Verification strategies to verify and automatically repair software vulnerabilities. Initially, we employ Bounded Model Checking (BMC) to locate the software vulnerability and derive a counterexample. The counterexample provides evidence that the system behaves incorrectly or contains a vulnerability. The counterexample that has been detected, along with the source code, are provided to the LLM engine. Our approach involves establishing a specialized prompt language for conducting code debugging and generation to understand the vulnerability's root cause and repair the code. Finally, we use BMC to verify the corrected version of the code generated by the LLM. As a proof of concept, we create ESBMC-AI based on the Efficient SMT-based Context-Bounded Model Checker (ESBMC) and a pre-trained Transformer model, specifically gpt-3.5-turbo, to detect and fix errors in C programs. Our experimentation involved generating a dataset comprising 1000 C code samples, each consisting of 20 to 50 lines of code. Notably, our proposed method achieved an impressive success rate of up to 80% in repairing vulnerable code encompassing buffer overflow and pointer dereference failures. We assert that this automated approach can effectively incorporate into the software development lifecycle's continuous integration and deployment (CI/CD) process.

As autonomous agentic systems scale across regulated critical infrastructures, the lack of mechanistic, hardware-rooted enforcement for high-frequency policy updates presents a fundamental safety gap. We introduce Ethical Hyper-Velocity (EHV), a novel architectural framework for the formal verification of AI governance policies at runtime. Unlike retrospective auditing frameworks (ISO/IEC 42001, NIST AI RMF) which introduce 14-30 day latencies, EHV relocates the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) into the inference pipeline via a Governance-Aware Just-In-Time (JIT) Compiler. By integrating Conflict-free Replicated Data Types (CRDTs) for policy synchronization and Epoch-based Attestation Caching within Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), EHV achieves Sub-millisecond Formal Determinism (SMFD). We demonstrate via TLA+ formal verification that non-compliant agentic actions are computationally unreachable within the system's bounded operating state space. We prove that O(1) runtime enforcement can eliminate the traditional trade-off between deployment velocity and governance integrity, reducing Governance Latency from O(days) to O(1).

Large Language Model (LLM) agents, capable of performing a broad range of actions, such as invoking tools and controlling robots, show great potential in tackling real-world challenges. LLM agents are typically prompted to produce actions by generating JSON or text in a pre-defined format, which is usually limited by constrained action space (e.g., the scope of pre-defined tools) and restricted flexibility (e.g., inability to compose multiple tools). This work proposes to use executable Python code to consolidate LLM agents' actions into a unified action space (CodeAct). Integrated with a Python interpreter, CodeAct can execute code actions and dynamically revise prior actions or emit new actions upon new observations through multi-turn interactions. Our extensive analysis of 17 LLMs on API-Bank and a newly curated benchmark shows that CodeAct outperforms widely used alternatives (up to 20% higher success rate). The encouraging performance of CodeAct motivates us to build an open-source LLM agent that interacts with environments by executing interpretable code and collaborates with users using natural language. To this end, we collect an instruction-tuning dataset CodeActInstruct that consists of 7k multi-turn interactions using CodeAct. We show that it can be used with existing data to improve models in agent-oriented tasks without compromising their general capability. CodeActAgent, finetuned from Llama2 and Mistral, is integrated with Python interpreter and uniquely tailored to perform sophisticated tasks (e.g., model training) using existing libraries and autonomously self-debug.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) have made tremendous progress in the past year, yet they still frequently produce misaligned actions that deviate from the user's original intent. Such misaligned actions may arise from external attacks (e.g., indirect prompt injection) or from internal limitations (e.g., erroneous reasoning). They not only expose CUAs to safety risks, but also degrade task efficiency and reliability. This work makes the first effort to define and study misaligned action detection in CUAs, with comprehensive coverage of both externally induced and internally arising misaligned actions. We further identify three common categories in real-world CUA deployment and construct MisActBench, a benchmark of realistic trajectories with human-annotated, action-level alignment labels. Moreover, we propose DeAction, a practical and universal guardrail that detects misaligned actions before execution and iteratively corrects them through structured feedback. DeAction outperforms all existing baselines across offline and online evaluations with moderate latency overhead: (1) On MisActBench, it outperforms baselines by over 15% absolute in F1 score; (2) In online evaluation, it reduces attack success rate by over 90% under adversarial settings while preserving or even improving task success rate in benign environments.

Multimodal agents for computer use rely exclusively on primitive actions (click, type, scroll) that require accurate visual grounding and lengthy execution chains, leading to cascading failures and performance bottlenecks. While other agents leverage rich programmatic interfaces (APIs, MCP servers, tools), computer-use agents (CUAs) remain isolated from these capabilities. We present UltraCUA, a foundation model that bridges this gap through hybrid action -- seamlessly integrating GUI primitives with high-level programmatic tool calls. To achieve this, our approach comprises four key components: (1) an automated pipeline that scales programmatic tools from software documentation, open-source repositories, and code generation; (2) a synthetic data engine producing over 17,000 verifiable tasks spanning real-world computer-use scenarios; (3) a large-scale high-quality hybrid action trajectory collection with both low-level GUI actions and high-level programmatic tool calls; and (4) a two-stage training pipeline combining supervised fine-tuning with online reinforcement learning, enabling strategic alternation between low-level and high-level actions. Experiments with our 7B and 32B models demonstrate substantial improvements over state-of-the-art agents. On OSWorld, UltraCUA models achieve an average 22% relative improvement over base models, while being 11% faster in terms of steps. Out-of-domain evaluation on WindowsAgentArena shows our model reaches 21.7% success rate, outperforming baselines trained on Windows data. The hybrid action mechanism proves critical, reducing error propagation while maintaining execution efficiency.

Reward-guided search methods have demonstrated strong potential in enhancing tool-using agents by effectively guiding sampling and exploration over complex action spaces. As a core design, those search methods utilize process reward models (PRMs) to provide step-level rewards, enabling more fine-grained monitoring. However, there is a lack of systematic and reliable evaluation benchmarks for PRMs in tool-using settings. In this paper, we introduce ToolPRMBench, a large-scale benchmark specifically designed to evaluate PRMs for tool-using agents. ToolPRMBench is built on top of several representative tool-using benchmarks and converts agent trajectories into step-level test cases. Each case contains the interaction history, a correct action, a plausible but incorrect alternative, and relevant tool metadata. We respectively utilize offline sampling to isolate local single-step errors and online sampling to capture realistic multi-step failures from full agent rollouts. A multi-LLM verification pipeline is proposed to reduce label noise and ensure data quality. We conduct extensive experiments across large language models, general PRMs, and tool-specialized PRMs on ToolPRMBench. The results reveal clear differences in PRM effectiveness and highlight the potential of specialized PRMs for tool-using. Code and data will be released at https://github.com/David-Li0406/ToolPRMBench.

The acquisition of agentic capabilities has transformed LLMs from "knowledge providers" to "action executors", a trend that while expanding LLMs' capability boundaries, significantly increases their susceptibility to malicious use. Previous work has shown that current LLM-based agents execute numerous malicious tasks even without being attacked, indicating a deficiency in agentic use safety alignment during the post-training phase. To address this gap, we propose AgentAlign, a novel framework that leverages abstract behavior chains as a medium for safety alignment data synthesis. By instantiating these behavior chains in simulated environments with diverse tool instances, our framework enables the generation of highly authentic and executable instructions while capturing complex multi-step dynamics. The framework further ensures model utility by proportionally synthesizing benign instructions through non-malicious interpretations of behavior chains, precisely calibrating the boundary between helpfulness and harmlessness. Evaluation results on AgentHarm demonstrate that fine-tuning three families of open-source models using our method substantially improves their safety (35.8% to 79.5% improvement) while minimally impacting or even positively enhancing their helpfulness, outperforming various prompting methods. The dataset and code have both been open-sourced.

Rapid evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) has achieved major advances in reasoning, planning, and function-calling capabilities. Multi-agentic collaborative frameworks using such LLMs place them at the center of solving software development-related tasks such as code generation. However, direct use of LLM generated code in production software development systems is problematic. The code could be unstable or erroneous and contain vulnerabilities such as data poisoning, malicious attacks, and hallucinations that could lead to widespread system malfunctions. This prohibits the adoption of LLM generated code in production AI systems where human code reviews and traditional secure testing tools are impractical or untrustworthy. In this paper, we discuss safety and reliability problems with the execution of LLM generated code and propose a Secure Transpiler and Executor of LLM-Generated Program (STELP), capable of executing LLM-generated code in a controlled and safe manner. STELP secures autonomous production AI systems involving code generation, filling the critical void left by the impracticality or limitations of traditional secure testing methodologies and human oversight. This includes applications such as headless code generation-execution and LLMs that produce executable code snippets as an action plan to be executed in real time. We contribute a human-validated dataset of insecure code snippets and benchmark our approach on publicly available datasets for correctness, safety, and latency. Our results demonstrate that our approach outperforms an existing method by a significant margin, particularly in its ability to safely execute risky code snippets. Warning: This paper contains malicious code snippets that should be run with caution.

With the advancement of multimodal large language models (MLLMs) and coding agents, the website development has shifted from manual programming to agent-based project-level code synthesis. Existing benchmarks rely on idealized assumptions, especially for well-structured, information-rich inputs and static execution settings. In contrast, real-world development is constrained by a critical bottleneck: the semantic misalignment between ambiguous, low-quality instructions from non-expert users and model understanding, which results in a failure mode that we term blind execution. To address this gap, we introduce InteractWeb-Bench, the first multimodal interactive benchmark for website generation under non-expert low-code user conditions. InteractWeb-Bench introduces four types of user agents and persona-driven instruction perturbations to systematically simulate diverse user behaviors, including ambiguity, redundancy, and contradiction, grounded in requirement engineering defect taxonomies. We develop an interactive execution environment for agents, featuring a unified action space comprising Clarify, Implement, Verify, and Submit, enabling iterative intent refinement, code synthesis, and visual feedback-based validation. Extensive experiments and analysis reveal that frontier MLLM-based agents remain trapped in blind execution, exposing limitations in intent recognition and adaptive interaction.

Recent advancements in software engineering agents have demonstrated promising capabilities in automating program improvements. However, their reliance on closed-source or resource-intensive models introduces significant deployment challenges in private environments, prompting a critical question: How can personally deployable open-source LLMs achieve comparable code reasoning performance? To this end, we propose a unified Test-Time Compute scaling framework that leverages increased inference-time computation instead of larger models. Our framework incorporates two complementary strategies: internal TTC and external TTC. Internally, we introduce a development-contextualized trajectory synthesis method leveraging real-world software repositories to bootstrap multi-stage reasoning processes, such as fault localization and patch generation. We further enhance trajectory quality through rejection sampling, rigorously evaluating trajectories along accuracy and complexity. Externally, we propose a novel development-process-based search strategy guided by reward models and execution verification. This approach enables targeted computational allocation at critical development decision points, overcoming limitations of existing "end-point only" verification methods. Evaluations on SWE-bench Verified demonstrate our 32B model achieves a 46\% issue resolution rate, surpassing significantly larger models such as DeepSeek R1 671B and OpenAI o1. Additionally, we provide the empirical validation of the test-time scaling phenomenon within SWE agents, revealing that models dynamically allocate more tokens to increasingly challenging problems, effectively enhancing reasoning capabilities. We publicly release all training data, models, and code to facilitate future research. https://github.com/yingweima2022/SWE-Reasoner

Computer-Use Agents (CUA) are becoming increasingly capable of autonomously operating digital environments through Graphical User Interfaces (GUI). Yet, most GUI remain designed primarily for humans--prioritizing aesthetics and usability--forcing agents to adopt human-oriented behaviors that are unnecessary for efficient task execution. At the same time, rapid advances in coding-oriented language models (Coder) have transformed automatic GUI design. This raises a fundamental question: Can CUA as judges to assist Coder for automatic GUI design? To investigate, we introduce AUI-Gym, a benchmark for Automatic GUI development spanning 52 applications across diverse domains. Using language models, we synthesize 1560 tasks that simulate real-world scenarios. To ensure task reliability, we further develop a verifier that programmatically checks whether each task is executable within its environment. Building on this, we propose a Coder-CUA in Collaboration framework: the Coder acts as Designer, generating and revising websites, while the CUA serves as Judge, evaluating functionality and refining designs. Success is measured not by visual appearance, but by task solvability and CUA navigation success rate. To turn CUA feedback into usable guidance, we design a CUA Dashboard that compresses multi-step navigation histories into concise visual summaries, offering interpretable guidance for iterative redesign. By positioning agents as both designers and judges, our framework shifts interface design toward agent-native efficiency and reliability. Our work takes a step toward shifting agents from passive use toward active participation in digital environments. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/showlab/AUI.

LLM-based coding agents extend their capabilities via third-party agent skills distributed through open marketplaces without mandatory security review. Unlike traditional packages, these skills are executed as operational directives with system-level privileges, so a single malicious skill can compromise the host. Prior work has not examined whether supply-chain attacks can directly hijack an agent's action space, such as file writes, shell commands, and network requests, despite existing safeguards. We introduce Document-Driven Implicit Payload Execution (DDIPE), which embeds malicious logic in code examples and configuration templates within skill documentation. Because agents reuse these examples during normal tasks, the payload executes without explicit prompts. Using an LLM-driven pipeline, we generate 1,070 adversarial skills from 81 seeds across 15 MITRE ATTACK categories. Across four frameworks and five models, DDIPE achieves 11.6% to 33.5% bypass rates, while explicit instruction attacks achieve 0% under strong defenses. Static analysis detects most cases, but 2.5% evade both detection and alignment. Responsible disclosure led to four confirmed vulnerabilities and two fixes.

Code Executing Reasoning is becoming a new non-functional metric that assesses the ability of large language models (LLMs) in programming tasks. State-of-the-art frameworks (CodeMind or REval) and benchmarks (CruxEval) usually focus on LLM's prediction of a given code's input/output or intermediate variable states/values on limited programs. However, there is no tool for more in-depth analysis of the results. Without such a tool, the observations about LLM's code execution reasoning cannot be generalized to more datasets, preventing the research community and practitioners from devising the next generation of LLMs with better code execution reasoning abilities. This paper introduces ExeRScope, a series of tools and heuristics to analyze the result of code execution reasoning frameworks to understand better the impact of code properties in the studied benchmarks on the code execution reasoning. With such tooling, analysis can be generalized to code with similar properties without the urgent need to design more benchmarks, which is a cumbersome effort.

Formal verification can provably guarantee the correctness of critical system software, but the high proof burden has long hindered its wide adoption. Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown success in code analysis and synthesis. In this paper, we present a combination of LLMs and static analysis to synthesize invariants, assertions, and other proof structures for a Rust-based formal verification framework called Verus. In a few-shot setting, LLMs demonstrate impressive logical ability in generating postconditions and loop invariants, especially when analyzing short code snippets. However, LLMs lack the ability to retain and propagate context information, a strength of traditional static analysis. Based on these observations, we developed a prototype based on OpenAI's GPT-4 model. Our prototype decomposes the verification task into multiple smaller ones, iteratively queries GPT-4, and combines its output with lightweight static analysis. We evaluated the prototype with a developer in the automation loop on 20 vector-manipulating programs. The results demonstrate that it significantly reduces human effort in writing entry-level proof code.

LLM agents increasingly act by writing code, yet a split persists between the runtime that drives the agent and the code the model writes. The runtime owns the loop, context, and control flow, and the model has little say over any of them. Letting model-written code shape the runtime itself would make agents more expressive, but it would also sharpen safety problems. A model can be diverted by a prompt injection, call the wrong tool, or fail partway and leave an inconsistent state, and each such failure reaches further when the code shapes the runtime than when it expresses a single action. We present LACUNA, a programming model for agents that closes this split while preserving safety. Each agent action is a typed call agent[T](task) that the LLM fills with code when execution reaches it, and the code is type-checked against the surrounding program before it runs. Because each action is accepted or rejected as a whole, a rejected one leaves the environment untouched, and its compiler diagnostics drive a retry. The same check also bounds which tools and data an action may use and how they flow. Our primitive expresses ReAct loops, sub-agents, skills, parallel decomposition, and multi-model planning as ordinary control flow. We evaluate LACUNA on a collection of test cases, BrowseComp-Plus, and τ^2-bench. On BrowseComp-Plus, 8.6% of generations are rejected before execution, with 0.7 retries per query on average, and the agent reaches 27.1% accuracy. On τ^2-bench, LACUNA solves 76.0% of 392 tasks across four domains with a capable model, on par with the baseline agent.

Verification is critical for improving agents: it provides the reward signal for Reinforcement Learning and enables inference-time gains through Test-Time Scaling (TTS). Despite its importance, verification in software engineering (SWE) agent settings often relies on code execution, which can be difficult to scale due to environment setup overhead. Scalable alternatives such as patch classifiers and heuristic methods exist, but they are less grounded in codebase context and harder to interpret. To this end, we explore Agentic Rubrics: an expert agent interacts with the repository to create a context-grounded rubric checklist, and candidate patches are then scored against it without requiring test execution. On SWE-Bench Verified under parallel TTS evaluation, Agentic Rubrics achieve a score of 54.2% on Qwen3-Coder-30B-A3B and 40.6% on Qwen3-32B, with at least a +3.5 percentage-point gain over the strongest baseline in our comparison set. We further analyze rubric behavior, showing that rubric scores are consistent with ground-truth tests while also flagging issues that tests do not capture. Our ablations show that agentic context gathering is essential for producing codebase-specific, unambiguous criteria. Together, these results suggest that Agentic Rubrics provide an efficient, scalable, and granular verification signal for SWE agents.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are evolving from passive observers into active agents, solving problems through Visual Expansion (invoking visual tools) and Knowledge Expansion (open-web search). However, existing evaluations fall short: they lack flexible tool integration, test visual and search tools separately, and evaluate primarily by final answers. Consequently, they cannot verify if tools were actually invoked, applied correctly, or used efficiently. To address this, we introduce Agentic-MME, a process-verified benchmark for Multimodal Agentic Capabilities. It contains 418 real-world tasks across 6 domains and 3 difficulty levels to evaluate capability synergy, featuring over 2,000 stepwise checkpoints that average 10+ person-hours of manual annotation per task. Each task includes a unified evaluation framework supporting sandboxed code and APIs, alongside a human reference trajectory annotated with stepwise checkpoints along dual-axis: S-axis and V-axis. To enable true process-level verification, we audit fine-grained intermediate states rather than just final answers, and quantify efficiency via an overthinking metric relative to human trajectories. Experimental results show the best model, Gemini3-pro, achieves 56.3% overall accuracy, which falls significantly to 23.0% on Level-3 tasks, underscoring the difficulty of real-world multimodal agentic problem solving.

Large language models demonstrate remarkable reasoning capabilities but often produce unreliable or incorrect responses. Existing verification methods are typically model-specific or domain-restricted, requiring significant computational resources and lacking scalability across diverse reasoning tasks. To address these limitations, we propose VerifiAgent, a unified verification agent that integrates two levels of verification: meta-verification, which assesses completeness and consistency in model responses, and tool-based adaptive verification, where VerifiAgent autonomously selects appropriate verification tools based on the reasoning type, including mathematical, logical, or commonsense reasoning. This adaptive approach ensures both efficiency and robustness across different verification scenarios. Experimental results show that VerifiAgent outperforms baseline verification methods (e.g., deductive verifier, backward verifier) among all reasoning tasks. Additionally, it can further enhance reasoning accuracy by leveraging feedback from verification results. VerifiAgent can also be effectively applied to inference scaling, achieving better results with fewer generated samples and costs compared to existing process reward models in the mathematical reasoning domain. Code is available at https://github.com/Jiuzhouh/VerifiAgent

Agentic AI systems act through tools and evolve their behavior over long, stochastic interaction traces. This setting complicates assurance, because behavior depends on nondeterministic environments and probabilistic model outputs. Prior work introduced runtime verification for agentic AI via Dynamic Probabilistic Assurance (DPA), learning an MDP online and model checking quantitative properties. A key limitation is that developers must manually define the state abstraction, which couples verification to application-specific heuristics and increases adoption friction. This paper proposes TriCEGAR, a trace-driven abstraction mechanism that automates state construction from execution logs and supports online construction of an agent behavioral MDP. TriCEGAR represents abstractions as predicate trees learned from traces and refined using counterexamples. We describe a framework-native implementation that (i) captures typed agent lifecycle events, (ii) builds abstractions from traces, (iii) constructs an MDP, and (iv) performs probabilistic model checking to compute bounds such as Pmax(success) and Pmin(failure). We also show how run likelihoods enable anomaly detection as a guardrailing signal.

As autonomous AI agents are used in regulated and safety-critical settings, organizations need effective ways to turn policy into enforceable controls. We introduce a regulatory machine learning framework that converts unstructured design artifacts (like PRDs, TDDs, and code) into verifiable runtime guardrails. Our Policy as Prompt method reads these documents and risk controls to build a source-linked policy tree. This tree is then compiled into lightweight, prompt-based classifiers for real-time runtime monitoring. The system is built to enforce least privilege and data minimization. For conformity assessment, it provides complete provenance, traceability, and audit logging, all integrated with a human-in-the-loop review process. Evaluations show our system reduces prompt-injection risk, blocks out-of-scope requests, and limits toxic outputs. It also generates auditable rationales aligned with AI governance frameworks. By treating policies as executable prompts (a policy-as-code for agents), this approach enables secure-by-design deployment, continuous compliance, and scalable AI safety and AI security assurance for regulatable ML.

Computer-using agents (CUAs) are becoming increasingly capable; however, it remains difficult to scale evaluation of whether a trajectory truly fulfills a user instruction. In this work, we study reward modeling from execution video: a sequence of keyframes from an agent trajectory that is independent of the agent's internal reasoning or actions. Although video-execution modeling is method-agnostic, it presents key challenges, including highly redundant layouts and subtle, localized cues that determine success. We introduce Execution Video Reward 53k (ExeVR-53k), a dataset of 53k high-quality video--task--reward triplets. We further propose adversarial instruction translation to synthesize negative samples with step-level annotations. To enable learning from long, high-resolution execution videos, we design spatiotemporal token pruning, which removes homogeneous regions and persistent tokens while preserving decisive UI changes. Building on these components, we fine-tune an Execution Video Reward Model (ExeVRM) that takes only a user instruction and a video-execution sequence to predict task success. Our ExeVRM 8B achieves 84.7% accuracy and 87.7% recall on video-execution assessment, outperforming strong proprietary models such as GPT-5.2 and Gemini-3 Pro across Ubuntu, macOS, Windows, and Android, while providing more precise temporal attribution. These results show that video-execution reward modeling can serve as a scalable, model-agnostic evaluator for CUAs.

Evaluating Computer Use Agents (CUAs) on interactive environments is fraught with methodological pitfalls that the field has yet to systematically address. We show that a 1MB replay script that blindly executes a recorded action sequence without ever observing the screen outperforms frontier models on prominent static benchmarks, and prove that its expected success rate is exactly equal to the source agent's pass@k in deterministic environments. We trace this and other failures to two root causes: non-principled environment design (static, unsandboxed, or unreliably verified environments) and non-principled evaluation methodology (naive aggregation and misuse of pass@k for stateful UI interactions). To address the first, we propose PRISM, five design principles for CUA environments (privileged verification, realistic environments, integrity-checked configurations, sandboxed execution, and multifactorial variability) and instantiate them in DigiWorld, a benchmark of 15 realistic sandboxed mobile applications able to evaluate agents in over 3.2 million verified unique configurations. To address the second, we develop an aggregation framework pairing Wilson score intervals with hierarchical bootstrap, producing confidence intervals that correctly account for the nested structure of CUA benchmarks, as we empirically demonstrate. All together, we show that principled environment design and rigorous evaluation methodology are not optional refinements but prerequisites for meaningful CUA research.

We present OpenComputer, a verifier-grounded framework for constructing verifiable software worlds for computer-use agents. OpenComputer integrates four components: (1) app-specific state verifiers that expose structured inspection endpoints over real applications, (2) a self-evolving verification layer that improves verifier reliability using execution-grounded feedback, (3) a task-generation pipeline that synthesizes realistic and machine-checkable desktop tasks, and (4) an evaluation harness that records full trajectories and computes auditable partial-credit rewards. In its current form, OpenComputer covers 33 desktop applications and 1,000 finalized tasks spanning browsers, office tools, creative software, development environments, file managers, and communication applications. Experiments show that OpenComputer's hard-coded verifiers align more closely with human adjudication than LLM-as-judge evaluation, especially when success depends on fine-grained application state. Frontier agents struggle with end-to-end completion despite partial progress, and open-source models exhibit sharp drops from their OSWorld-Verified scores, exposing a persistent gap in robust computer automation.

Code executability plays a vital role in software debugging and testing (e.g., detecting runtime exceptions or assertion violations). However, code execution, especially partial or arbitrary code execution, is a non-trivial task due to missing definitions and complex third-party dependencies. To make partial code (such as code snippets posted on the web or code fragments deep inside complex software projects) executable, the existing study has proposed a machine learning model to predict the undefined element types and inject the pre-defined dummy values into execution. However, the performance of their tool is limited due to its simply designed dummy values and the inability to continue learning. In this paper, we design and implement a novel framework, named SelfPiCo (Self Guided Partial Code Executor), to dynamically guide partial code execution by incorporating the open-source LLM (i.e., Code Llama) within an interactive loop. Particularly, SelfPiCo leverages few-shot in-context learning and chain-of-thought reasoning to elicit human knowledge and logical reasoning based on fine-tuning the Code Llama model. SelfPiCo continuously learns from code execution results and refines its predictions step after step. Our evaluations demonstrate that SelfPiCo can execute 72.7% and 83.3% of all lines in the open-source code and Stack Overflow snippets, outperforming the most recent state-of-the-art Lexecutor by 37.9% and 33.5%, respectively. Moreover, SelfPiCo successfully detected 18 and 33 runtime type error issues by executing the partial code from eight GitHub software projects and 43 Stack Overflow posts, demonstrating the practical usage and potential application of our framework in practice.

Tool-using automation systems, from scripts and CI bots to agentic assistants, fail in recurring patterns. Common failures include unsafe side effects, invalid arguments, uncontrolled retries, and leakage of sensitive outputs. Many mitigations are model-centric and prompt-dependent, so they are brittle and do not generalize to non-LLM callers. We present Policy-First Tooling, a model-agnostic permission layer that mediates tool invocation through explicit constraints, risk-aware gating, recovery controls, and auditable explanations. The paper contributes a compact policy DSL, a runtime enforcement architecture with actionable rationale and fix hints, and a reproducible benchmark based on trace replay with controlled fault and misuse injection. In 225 controlled runs across five policy packs and three fault profiles, stricter packs improve violation prevention from 0.000 in P0 to 0.681 in P4, while task success drops from 0.356 to 0.067. Retry amplification decreases from 3.774 in P0 to 1.378 in P4, and leakage recall reaches 0.875 under injected secret outputs. These results make safety to utility trade-offs explicit and measurable.

Recent advances in large language models have improved the capabilities of coding agents, yet systematic evaluation of complex, end-to-end website development remains limited. To address this gap, we introduce Vision2Web, a hierarchical benchmark for visual website development, spanning from static UI-to-code generation, interactive multi-page frontend reproduction, to long-horizon full-stack website development. The benchmark is constructed from real-world websites and comprises a total of 193 tasks across 16 categories, with 918 prototype images and 1,255 test cases. To support flexible, thorough and reliable evaluation, we propose workflow-based agent verification paradigm based on two complementary components: a GUI agent verifier and a VLM-based judge. We evaluate multiple visual language models instantiated under different coding-agent frameworks, revealing substantial performance gaps at all task levels, with state-of-the-art models still struggling on full-stack development.

Code verifiers play a critical role in post-verification for LLM-based code generation, yet existing supervised fine-tuning methods suffer from data scarcity, high failure rates, and poor inference efficiency. While reinforcement learning (RL) offers a promising alternative by optimizing models through execution-driven rewards without labeled supervision, our preliminary results show that naive RL with only functionality rewards fails to generate effective unit tests for difficult branches and samples. We first theoretically analyze showing that branch coverage, sample difficulty, syntactic and functional correctness can be jointly modeled as RL rewards, where optimizing these signals can improve the reliability of unit-test-based verification. Guided by this analysis, we design syntax- and functionality-aware rewards and further propose branch- and sample-difficulty--aware RL using exponential reward shaping and static analysis metrics. With this formulation, CVeDRL achieves state-of-the-art performance with only 0.6B parameters, yielding up to 28.97% higher pass rate and 15.08% higher branch coverage than GPT-3.5, while delivering over 20times faster inference than competitive baselines. Code is available at https://github.com/LIGHTCHASER1/CVeDRL.git

Autonomous coding agents are increasingly integrated into software development workflows, offering capabilities that extend beyond code suggestion to active system interaction and environment management. OpenClaw, a representative platform in this emerging paradigm, introduces an extensible skill ecosystem that allows third-party developers to inject behavioral guidance through lifecycle hooks during agent initialization. While this design enhances automation and customization, it also opens a novel and unexplored attack surface. In this paper, we identify and systematically characterize guidance injection, a stealthy attack vector that embeds adversarial operational narratives into bootstrap guidance files. Unlike traditional prompt injection, which relies on explicit malicious instructions, guidance injection manipulates the agent's reasoning context by framing harmful actions as routine best practices. These narratives are automatically incorporated into the agent's interpretive framework and influence future task execution without raising suspicion.We construct 26 malicious skills spanning 13 attack categories including credential exfiltration, workspace destruction, privilege escalation, and persistent backdoor installation. We evaluate them using ORE-Bench, a realistic developer workspace benchmark we developed. Across 52 natural user prompts and six state-of-the-art LLM backends, our attacks achieve success rates from 16.0% to 64.2%, with the majority of malicious actions executed autonomously without user confirmation. Furthermore, 94% of our malicious skills evade detection by existing static and LLM-based scanners. Our findings reveal fundamental tensions in the design of autonomous agent ecosystems and underscore the urgent need for defenses based on capability isolation, runtime policy enforcement, and transparent guidance provenance.

A promising research direction in enabling LLMs to generate consistently correct code involves addressing their inability to properly estimate program execution, particularly for code they generate. In this work, we demonstrate that Code LLMs can be trained to simulate program execution in a step-by-step manner and that this capability can be leveraged to improve competitive programming performance. Our approach combines supervised fine-tuning on natural language execution traces, textual explanations grounded in true execution, with reinforcement learning using verifiable rewards. We introduce two complementary objectives: output prediction given code and inputs, and solving competitive programming tasks with either ground-truth or self-predicted execution feedback. These objectives enable models to perform self-verification over multiple candidate solutions, and iterative self-fixing by simulating test execution. Across multiple competitive programming benchmarks, our method yields consistent improvements over standard reasoning approaches. We further present ablations and analysis to elucidate the role of execution simulation and its limitations.

Large language models (LLMs) can translate natural language into optimization code, but silent failures pose a critical risk: code that executes and returns solver-feasible solutions may encode semantically incorrect formulations, creating a feasibility-correctness gap of up to 90 percentage points on compositional problems. We introduce ReLoop, addressing silent failures from two complementary directions. Structured generation decomposes code production into a four-stage reasoning chain (understand, formalize, synthesize, verify) that mirrors expert modeling practice, with explicit variable-type reasoning and self-verification to prevent formulation errors at their source. Behavioral verification detects errors that survive generation by testing whether the formulation responds correctly to solver-based parameter perturbation, without requiring ground truth -- an external semantic signal that bypasses the self-consistency problem inherent in LLM-based code review. The two mechanisms are complementary: structured generation dominates on complex compositional problems, while behavioral verification becomes the largest single contributor on problems with localized formulation defects. Together with execution recovery via IIS-enhanced diagnostics, ReLoop raises correctness from 22.6% to 31.1% and execution from 72.1% to 100.0% on the strongest model, with consistent gains across five models spanning three paradigms (foundation, SFT, RL) and three benchmarks. We additionally release RetailOpt-190, 190 compositional retail optimization scenarios targeting the multi-constraint interactions where LLMs most frequently fail.

Developing AI agents to autonomously manipulate graphical user interfaces is a long challenging task. Recent advances in data scaling law inspire us to train computer-use agents with a scaled instruction set, yet using behavior cloning to train agents still requires immense high-quality trajectories. To meet the scalability need, we designed STEVE, a step verification pipeline for computer-use agent training. First, we establish a large instruction set for computer-use agents and collect trajectory data with some suboptimal agents. GPT-4o is used to verify the correctness of each step in the trajectories based on the screens before and after the action execution, assigning each step with a binary label. Last, we adopt the Kahneman and Tversky Optimization to optimize the agent from the binary stepwise labels. Extensive experiments manifest that our agent outperforms supervised finetuning by leveraging both positive and negative actions within a trajectory. Also, STEVE enables us to train a 7B vision-language model as a computer-use agent, achieving leading performance in the challenging live desktop environment WinAgentArena with great efficiency at a reduced cost. Code and data: https://github.com/FanbinLu/STEVE.

Automating real-world software engineering tasks remains challenging for large language model (LLM)-based agents due to the need for long-horizon reasoning over large, evolving codebases and making consistent decisions across interdependent actions. Existing approaches typically rely on static prompting strategies or handcrafted heuristics to select actions such as code editing, file navigation, and test execution, but they lack fine-grained feedback on intermediate decisions. This leads to inefficient exploration, error propagation, and brittle solution trajectories. To address this limitation, we propose SWE-Shepherd, a framework that introduces Process Reward Models (PRMs) to provide dense, step-level supervision for repository-level code agents. Using trajectories from SWE-Bench, we construct an action-level reward dataset and train a lightweight reward model on a base LLM to estimate the usefulness of intermediate actions. During inference, the PRM evaluates candidate actions and guides the agent toward higher-reward decisions without requiring full reinforcement learning. Experiments on SWE-Bench Verified demonstrate improved interaction efficiency and action quality, while also highlighting challenges in aligning intermediate rewards with final task success.

Command-line interfaces (CLIs) provide structured textual environments for system administration. Explorations have been performed using pre-trained language models (PLMs) to simulate these environments for safe interaction in high-risk environments. However, their use has been constrained to frozen, large parameter models like GPT. For smaller architectures to reach a similar level of believability, a rich dataset of CLI interactions is required. Existing public datasets focus on mapping natural-language tasks to commands, omitting crucial execution data such as exit codes, outputs, and environmental side effects, limiting their usability for behavioral modeling. We introduce a Shell Input -Output Environment (ShIOEnv), which casts command construction as a Markov Decision Process whose state is the partially built sequence and whose actions append arguments. After each action, ShIOEnv executes the candidate and returns its exit status, output, and progress toward a minimal-length behavioral objective. Due to the intractable nature of the combinatorial argument state-action space, we derive a context-free grammar from man pages to mask invalid arguments from being emitted. We explore random and proximal-policy optimization (PPO)-optimized sampling of unrestricted and grammar-masked action spaces to produce four exploration strategies. We observed that grammar masking and PPO significantly improve sample efficiency to produce a higher quality dataset (maximizing the number of arguments while minimizing redundancies). Policy-generated datasets of shell input-output behavior pairs are used to fine-tune CodeT5, where we observe 85% improvements in BLEU-4 when constraining the action space to grammar productions with an additional 26% improvement when applying PPO. The ShIOEnv environment and curated command behavior datasets are released for use in future research.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has become a key technique for enhancing large language models (LLMs), with verification engineering playing a central role. However, best practices for RL in instruction following remain underexplored. In this work, we explore the verification challenge in RL for instruction following and propose VerIF, a verification method that combines rule-based code verification with LLM-based verification from a large reasoning model (e.g., QwQ-32B). To support this approach, we construct a high-quality instruction-following dataset, VerInstruct, containing approximately 22,000 instances with associated verification signals. We apply RL training with VerIF to two models, achieving significant improvements across several representative instruction-following benchmarks. The trained models reach state-of-the-art performance among models of comparable size and generalize well to unseen constraints. We further observe that their general capabilities remain unaffected, suggesting that RL with VerIF can be integrated into existing RL recipes to enhance overall model performance. We have released our datasets, codes, and models to facilitate future research at https://github.com/THU-KEG/VerIF.

Current paradigms for code verification rely heavily on external mechanisms-such as execution-based unit tests or auxiliary LLM judges-which are often labor-intensive or limited by the judging model's own capabilities. This raises a fundamental, yet unexplored question: Can an LLM's functional correctness be assessed purely from its internal computational structure? Our primary objective is to investigate whether the model's neural dynamics encode internally decodable signals that are predictive of logical validity during code generation. Inspired by mechanistic interpretability, we propose to treat code verification as a mechanistic diagnostic task, mapping the model's explicit algorithmic trajectory into line-level attribution graphs. By decomposing complex residual flows, we aim to identify the structural signatures that distinguish sound reasoning from logical failure within the model's internal circuits. Analysis across Python, C++, and Java confirms that intrinsic correctness signals are robust across diverse syntaxes. Topological features from these internal graphs predict correctness more reliably than surface heuristics and enable targeted causal interventions to fix erroneous logic. These findings establish internal introspection as a decodable property for verifying generated code. Our code is at https:// github.com/bruno686/CodeCircuit.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, particularly in the face of stealthy and complex jailbreaks, presents a formidable challenge. In this study, we present a simple yet highly effective defense strategy, i.e., Intention Analysis Prompting (IAPrompt). The principle behind is to trigger LLMs' inherent self-correct and improve ability through a two-stage process: 1) essential intention analysis, and 2) policy-aligned response. Notably, IAPrompt is an inference-only method, thus could enhance the safety of LLMs without compromising their helpfulness. Extensive experiments on SAP200 and DAN benchmarks across Vicuna, ChatGLM, MPT, DeepSeek, and GPT-3.5 show that IAPrompt could consistently and significantly reduce the harmfulness in response (averagely -46.5% attack success rate) and maintain the general helpfulness. Further analyses present some insights into how our method works. To facilitate reproducibility, We release our code and scripts at: https://github.com/alphadl/SafeLLM_with_IntentionAnalysis

AI agents that execute tasks via tool calls frequently hallucinate results - fabricating tool executions, misstating output counts, or presenting inferences as facts. Recent approaches to verifiable AI inference rely on zero-knowledge proofs, which provide cryptographic guarantees but impose minutes of proving time per query, making them impractical for interactive agents. We propose NabaOS, a lightweight verification framework inspired by Indian epistemology (Nyaya Shastra), which classifies every claim in an LLM response by its epistemic source (pramana): direct tool output (pratyaksha), inference (anumana), external testimony (shabda), absence (abhava), or ungrounded opinion. Our runtime generates HMAC-signed tool execution receipts that the LLM cannot forge, then cross-references claims against these receipts to detect hallucinations in real time. We evaluate on NyayaVerifyBench, a new benchmark of 1,800 agent response scenarios across four languages with injected hallucinations of six types. NabaOS detects 94.2% of fabricated tool references, 87.6% of count misstatements, and 91.3% of false absence claims, with <15ms verification overhead per response. For deep delegation (agents performing multi-step web tasks), our cross-checking protocol catches 78.4% of URL fabrications via independent re-fetching. We compare against five approaches: zkLLM (cryptographic proofs, 180s/query), TOPLOC (locality-sensitive hashing), SPEX (sampling-based proof of execution), tensor commitments, and self-consistency checking. NabaOS achieves the best cost-latency-coverage trade-off for interactive agents: 94.2% coverage at <15ms versus zkLLM's near-perfect coverage at 180,000ms. For interactive agents, practical receipt-based verification provides better cost-benefit than cryptographic proofs, and epistemic classification gives users actionable trust signals rather than binary judgments.

Graphical User Interfaces (GUIs) are central to human-computer interaction, yet automating complex GUI tasks remains a major challenge for autonomous agents, largely due to a lack of scalable, high-quality training data. While recordings of human demonstrations offer a rich data source, they are typically long, unstructured, and lack annotations, making them difficult for agents to learn from.To address this, we introduce ShowUI-Aloha, a comprehensive pipeline that transforms unstructured, in-the-wild human screen recordings from desktop environments into structured, actionable tasks. Our framework includes four key components: A recorder that captures screen video along with precise user interactions like mouse clicks, keystrokes, and scrolls. A learner that semantically interprets these raw interactions and the surrounding visual context, translating them into descriptive natural language captions. A planner that reads the parsed demonstrations, maintains task states, and dynamically formulates the next high-level action plan based on contextual reasoning. An executor that faithfully carries out these action plans at the OS level, performing precise clicks, drags, text inputs, and window operations with safety checks and real-time feedback. Together, these components provide a scalable solution for collecting and parsing real-world human data, demonstrating a viable path toward building general-purpose GUI agents that can learn effectively from simply observing humans.

Users rely on execution traces to observe agent behavior, diagnose failures, and ensure accountability. These traces contain rich procedural detail, including tool invocations, intermediate decisions, and error-recovery logic. Yet this detail can expose private procedural skills, allowing downstream methods to recover key formulas, thresholds, and strategies without access to model weights or skill files. To quantify this risk and evaluate protection, we construct CapTraceBench, a benchmark of 75 specialized long-horizon tasks and 154 curated skills across seven domains. We also introduce RedAct https://github.com/XuShuwenn/RedAct, a protected trace release framework that localizes protected key information, rewrites traces while preserving verifier-critical evidence, and embeds behavioral watermarks for downstream provenance analysis. Across representative trace reuse methods, RedAct reduces normalized skill transfer (NST) from 44.7--67.1\% on raw traces to below the no-skill baseline, while preserving audit evidence. Its standalone behavioral watermarks reach 93.6--100.0\% true detection with a false alarm rate of at most 1.9\%. These results frame public agent traces as security interfaces and show that selective redaction can reduce procedural capability leakage without removing audit evidence.

We propose SWE-Universe, a scalable and efficient framework for automatically constructing real-world software engineering (SWE) verifiable environments from GitHub pull requests (PRs). To overcome the prevalent challenges of automatic building, such as low production yield, weak verifiers, and prohibitive cost, our framework utilizes a building agent powered by an efficient custom-trained model. This agent employs iterative self-verification and in-loop hacking detection to ensure the reliable generation of high-fidelity, verifiable tasks. Using this method, we scale the number of real-world multilingual SWE environments to a million scale (807,693). We demonstrate the profound value of our environments through large-scale agentic mid-training and reinforcement learning. Finally, we applied this technique to Qwen3-Max-Thinking and achieved a score of 75.3% on SWE-Bench Verified. Our work provides both a critical resource and a robust methodology to advance the next generation of coding agents.

Large Action Models (LAMs) extend large language models by enabling autonomous decision-making and tool execution, making them promising for automating scientific workflows. However, scientific workflows impose strict requirements on reproducibility, auditability, and deterministic execution, which are not satisfied by generic LLM-based agents. Unconstrained action generation can lead to silent state changes, non-deterministic executions, and irreproducible experimental results, limiting the applicability of LAMs in scientific settings. In this paper, we propose R-LAM, a reproducibility-constrained framework for applying Large Action Models to scientific workflow automation. R-LAM introduces structured action schemas, deterministic execution policies, and explicit provenance tracking to ensure that every action and intermediate artifact is auditable and replayable. The framework supports failure-aware execution loops and controlled workflow forking, enabling iterative experimentation without compromising reproducibility. We implement R-LAM as a lightweight Python framework and release it as an open-source PyPI package to facilitate reproducible research. An experimental evaluation of representative scientific workflows demonstrates that R-LAM improves reproducibility success rates and execution reliability compared to unconstrained LLM-based agents, while retaining adaptive control over workflow execution.

MOLOT (Malicious Operational Logic Observation Transformer) is a static malicious-code detection system designed for SAST setup where package metadata, maintainer history, and dynamic execution traces may be unavailable or unreliable. The system represents source code as behavior sequences derived from static call graphs, includes an explanation stage that ranks suspicious behavior activities and maps them back to source-code locations. The approach is evaluated on Python and JavaScript packages from PyPI and npm, compared with opensource detection tools, and validated under product constraints including runtime, memory use, and false-positive rates observed in a real moderation workflow. We also release Open Malicious-Code Bench, a public benchmark for reproducible evaluation of malicious-package detection methods. The results show that static behavior-sequence modeling can provide accurate, explainable, and deployable malicious-code detection for modern DevSecOps workflows.

AI agents increasingly act through external tools: they query databases, execute shell commands, read and write files, and send network requests. Yet in most current agent stacks, model-generated tool calls are handed to the execution layer with no framework-agnostic control point in between. Post-execution observability can record these actions, but it cannot stop them before side effects occur. We present AEGIS, a pre-execution firewall and audit layer for AI agents. AEGIS interposes on the tool-execution path and applies a three-stage pipeline: (i) deep string extraction from tool arguments, (ii) content-first risk scanning, and (iii) composable policy validation. High-risk calls can be held for human approval, and all decisions are recorded in a tamper-evident audit trail based on Ed25519 signatures and SHA-256 hash chaining. In the current implementation, AEGIS supports 14 agent frameworks across Python, JavaScript, and Go with lightweight integration. On a curated suite of 48 attackinstances, AEGIS blocks all attacks in the suite before execution; on 500 benign tool calls, it yields a 1.2% false positive rate; and across 1,000 consecutive interceptions, it adds 8.3 ms median latency. The live demo will show end-to-end interception of benign, malicious, and human-escalated tool calls, allowing attendees to observe real-time blocking, approval workflows, and audit-trail generation. These results suggest that pre-execution mediation for AI agents can be practical, low-overhead, and directly deployable.

Many popular programming languages, including C#, Java, and Python, support exceptions. Exceptions are thrown during program execution if an unwanted event happens, e.g., a method is invoked with an illegal argument value. Software developers write exceptional behavior tests (EBTs) to check that their code detects unwanted events and throws appropriate exceptions. Prior research studies have shown the importance of EBTs, but those studies also highlighted that developers put most of their efforts on "happy paths", e.g., paths without unwanted events. To help developers fill the gap, we present the first framework, dubbed exLong, that automatically generates EBTs. exLong is a large language model instruction-tuned from CodeLlama and embeds reasoning about traces that lead to throw statements, conditional expressions that guard throw statements, and non-exceptional behavior tests that execute similar traces. We compare exLong with the state-of-the-art models for test generation (CAT-LM) and one of the strongest foundation models (GPT3.5), as well as with analysis-based tools for test generation (Randoop and EvoSuite). Our results show that exLong outperforms existing models and tools. Furthermore, we contributed several pull requests to open-source projects and 23 EBTs generated by exLong were already accepted.

Code auditing is the process of reviewing code with the aim of identifying bugs. Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising capabilities for this task without requiring compilation, while also supporting user-friendly customization. However, auditing a code repository with LLMs poses significant challenges: limited context windows and hallucinations can degrade the quality of bug reports, and analyzing large-scale repositories incurs substantial time and token costs, hindering efficiency and scalability. This work introduces an LLM-based agent, RepoAudit, designed to perform autonomous repository-level code auditing. Equipped with agent memory, RepoAudit explores the codebase on demand by analyzing data-flow facts along feasible program paths within individual functions. It further incorporates a validator module to mitigate hallucinations by verifying data-flow facts and checking the satisfiability of path conditions associated with potential bugs, thereby reducing false positives. RepoAudit detects 40 true bugs across 15 real-world benchmark projects with a precision of 78.43%, requiring on average only 0.44 hours and $2.54 per project. Also, it detects 185 new bugs in high-profile projects, among which 174 have been confirmed or fixed. We have open-sourced RepoAudit at https://github.com/PurCL/RepoAudit.

Agents powered by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly adopted in the software industry, contributing code as collaborators or even autonomous developers. As their presence grows, it becomes important to assess the current boundaries of their coding abilities. Existing agentic coding benchmarks, however, cover a limited task scope, e.g., bug fixing within a single pull request (PR), and often rely on non-executable evaluations or lack an automated approach for continually updating the evaluation coverage. To address such issues, we propose FeatureBench, a benchmark designed to evaluate agentic coding performance in end-to-end, feature-oriented software development. FeatureBench incorporates an execution-based evaluation protocol and a scalable test-driven method that automatically derives tasks from code repositories with minimal human effort. By tracing from unit tests along a dependency graph, our approach can identify feature-level coding tasks spanning multiple commits and PRs scattered across the development timeline, while ensuring the proper functioning of other features after the separation. Using this framework, we curated 200 challenging evaluation tasks and 3825 executable environments from 24 open-source repositories in the first version of our benchmark. Empirical evaluation reveals that the state-of-the-art agentic model, such as Claude 4.5 Opus, which achieves a 74.4% resolved rate on SWE-bench, succeeds on only 11.0% of tasks, opening new opportunities for advancing agentic coding. Moreover, benefiting from our automated task collection toolkit, FeatureBench can be easily scaled and updated over time to mitigate data leakage. The inherent verifiability of constructed environments also makes our method potentially valuable for agent training.

Building generalist embodied agents capable of solving complex real-world tasks remains a fundamental challenge in AI. Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have significantly advanced the reasoning capabilities of such agents through strong vision-language knowledge and chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning, yet remain brittle when faced with challenging out-of-distribution scenarios. To address this, we propose Verifier-Guided Action Selection (VegAS), a test-time framework designed to improve the robustness of MLLM-based embodied agents through an explicit verification step. At inference time, rather than committing to a single decoded action, VeGAS samples an ensemble of candidate actions and uses a generative verifier to identify the most reliable choice, without modifying the underlying policy. Crucially, we find that using an MLLM off-the-shelf as a verifier yields no improvement, motivating our LLM-driven data synthesis strategy, which automatically constructs a diverse curriculum of failure cases to expose the verifier to a rich distribution of potential errors at training time. Across embodied reasoning benchmarks spanning the Habitat and ALFRED environments, VeGAS consistently improves generalization, achieving up to a 36% relative performance gain over strong CoT baselines on the most challenging multi-object, long-horizon tasks.

Computer-use agents provide a promising path toward general software automation because they can interact directly with arbitrary graphical user interfaces instead of relying on brittle, application-specific integrations. Despite recent advances in benchmark performance, strong computer-use agents remain expensive and slow in practice, since most systems invoke large multimodal models at nearly every interaction step. We argue that this uniform allocation of compute is fundamentally inefficient for long-horizon GUI tasks. Such trajectories are highly heterogeneous: many steps are routine and can be handled reliably by smaller, cheaper policies, while errors tend to concentrate at a relatively small number of high-risk moments. Across computer-use benchmarks, these failures repeatedly take two forms: progress stalls, where the agent loops, repeats ineffective actions, or fails to make meaningful progress, and silent semantic drift, where the agent continues taking locally plausible actions after already deviating from the user's true goal. To address this inefficiency, we propose an event-driven, step-level cascade for computer-use agents that runs a small policy by default and escalates to a stronger model only when lightweight learned monitors detect elevated risk. Our framework combines two complementary signals: a Stuck Monitor that detects degraded progress from recent reasoning-action history and triggers recovery, and a Milestone Monitor that identifies semantically meaningful checkpoints where sparse verification is most informative for catching drift. This design turns always-on frontier-model inference into adaptive, on-demand compute allocation over the course of an evolving interaction. The framework is modular and deployment-oriented: it can be layered on top of existing computer-use agents without changing the underlying agent architecture or retraining the large model.

Membership inference attacks (MIAs) have been extensively studied in large language models (LLMs) and vision-language models (VLMs), yet their implications for vision-language-action (VLA) models remain largely unexplored. VLA models differ from standard LLMs and VLMs in several important ways: they are often fine-tuned for many epochs on relatively small embodied datasets, operate over constrained and structured action spaces, and expose action outputs that can be observed as executable behaviors and temporally correlated trajectories. These characteristics suggest a distinct and potentially more informative attack surface for membership inference. In this work, we present the first systematic study of MIAs against VLA systems. We formalize two membership inference settings for VLA models: sample-level inference over individual transition samples and trajectory-level inference over complete embodied demonstrations. We further develop a suite of attack methods under multiple access regimes, including strict black-box access. Our attacks exploit both classic MIA signals, such as token likelihood, and VLA-specific signals, such as observable action errors and temporal motion patterns. Across multiple VLA benchmarks and representative VLA models, these attacks achieve strong inference performance, showing that VLA models are highly vulnerable to membership inference. Notably, black-box attacks based only on generated actions achieve strong performance, highlighting a practical privacy risk for deployed embodied AI systems. Our findings reveal a previously underexplored privacy risk in robotic and embodied AI, and underscore the need for dedicated privacy evaluation and defenses for VLA models.

Modern software infrastructure increasingly relies on LLM agents for development and maintenance, such as Claude Code and Gemini-cli. However, these AI agents differ fundamentally from traditional deterministic software, posing a significant challenge to conventional monitoring and debugging. This creates a critical semantic gap: existing tools observe either an agent's high-level intent (via LLM prompts) or its low-level actions (e.g., system calls), but cannot correlate these two views. This blindness makes it difficult to distinguish between benign operations, malicious attacks, and costly failures. We introduce AgentSight, an AgentOps observability framework that bridges this semantic gap using a hybrid approach. Our approach, boundary tracing, monitors agents from outside their application code at stable system interfaces using eBPF. AgentSight intercepts TLS-encrypted LLM traffic to extract semantic intent, monitors kernel events to observe system-wide effects, and causally correlates these two streams across process boundaries using a real-time engine and secondary LLM analysis. This instrumentation-free technique is framework-agnostic, resilient to rapid API changes, and incurs less than 3% performance overhead. Our evaluation shows AgentSight detects prompt injection attacks, identifies resource-wasting reasoning loops, and reveals hidden coordination bottlenecks in multi-agent systems. AgentSight is released as an open-source project at https://github.com/agent-sight/agentsight.

Formal specification is essential for rigorous program verification, yet writing correct specifications remains costly and difficult to automate. Although large language models (LLMs) and agents have shown promising progress, their true capabilities and failure modes remain unclear. We present the first systematic and contamination-aware study of LLM- and agent-based formal specification generation for C programs. We introduce LiveFMBench, a continuously evolving benchmark of 630 ACSL (ANSI/ISO C Specification Language)-annotated C programs, including 360 newly collected cases designed to mitigate data leakage. Using this benchmark, we evaluate direct prompting with different sampling sizes, reasoning-enabled (thinking mode) inference, the agentic pipeline, and perform a fine-grained failure analysis. Experimental results reveal that naive evaluation substantially overestimates performance because models under direct prompting may exhibit unfaithful behaviors, such as deceiving automated provers or ignoring code-context constraints; after excluding such cases, the true specification generation accuracy drops by approximately 20\%. We further find that both increased sampling and thinking mode significantly improve success rates, with smaller models benefiting more from thinking mode. Agentic pipelines are particularly effective under low sampling budgets and on harder datasets. Failure analysis further shows that incorrect loop invariants are the dominant error type, while agentic pipelines notably reduce assertion errors. These results expose fundamental limitations in current LLM-based approaches and suggest they remain far from replacing human-authored formal specifications. We release LiveFMBench at https://huggingface.co/datasets/fm-universe/Live-FM-Bench and all evaluation artifacts to support future research.

Computer-use agents extend language models from text generation to persistent action over tools, files, and execution environments. Unlike chat systems, they maintain state across interactions and translate intermediate outputs into concrete actions. This creates a distinct safety challenge in that harmful behavior may emerge through sequences of individually plausible steps, including intermediate actions that appear locally acceptable but collectively lead to unauthorized actions. We present AgentHazard, a benchmark for evaluating harmful behavior in computer-use agents. AgentHazard contains 2,653 instances spanning diverse risk categories and attack strategies. Each instance pairs a harmful objective with a sequence of operational steps that are locally legitimate but jointly induce unsafe behavior. The benchmark evaluates whether agents can recognize and interrupt harm arising from accumulated context, repeated tool use, intermediate actions, and dependencies across steps. We evaluate AgentHazard on Claude Code, OpenClaw, and IFlow using mostly open or openly deployable models from the Qwen3, Kimi, GLM, and DeepSeek families. Our experimental results indicate that current systems remain highly vulnerable. In particular, when powered by Qwen3-Coder, Claude Code exhibits an attack success rate of 73.63\%, suggesting that model alignment alone does not reliably guarantee the safety of autonomous agents.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) suggest great promises in code and proof generations. However, scaling automated formal verification to real-world projects requires resolving cross-module dependencies and global contexts, which are crucial challenges overlooked by existing LLM-based methods with a special focus on targeting isolated, function-level verification tasks. To systematically explore and address the significant challenges of verifying entire software repositories, we introduce RVBench, the first verification benchmark explicitly designed for repository-level evaluation, constructed from four diverse and complex open-source Verus projects. We further introduce RagVerus, an extensible framework that synergizes retrieval-augmented generation with context-aware prompting to automate proof synthesis for multi-module repositories. RagVerus triples proof pass rates on existing benchmarks under constrained model inference budgets, and achieves a 27% relative improvement on the more challenging RVBench benchmark, demonstrating a scalable and sample-efficient verification solution.

Software testing and verification are critical for ensuring the reliability and security of modern software systems. Traditionally, formal verification techniques, such as model checking and theorem proving, have provided rigorous frameworks for detecting bugs and vulnerabilities. However, these methods often face scalability challenges when applied to complex, real-world programs. Recently, the advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) has introduced a new paradigm for software analysis, leveraging their ability to understand insecure coding practices. Although LLMs demonstrate promising capabilities in tasks such as bug prediction and invariant generation, they lack the formal guarantees of classical methods. This paper presents a comprehensive study of state-of-the-art software testing and verification, focusing on three key approaches: classical formal methods, LLM-based analysis, and emerging hybrid techniques, which combine their strengths. We explore each approach's strengths, limitations, and practical applications, highlighting the potential of hybrid systems to address the weaknesses of standalone methods. We analyze whether integrating formal rigor with LLM-driven insights can enhance the effectiveness and scalability of software verification, exploring their viability as a pathway toward more robust and adaptive testing frameworks.

We present ExCyTIn-Bench, the first benchmark to Evaluate an LLM agent x on the task of Cyber Threat Investigation through security questions derived from investigation graphs. Real-world security analysts must sift through a large number of heterogeneous alert signals and security logs, follow multi-hop chains of evidence, and compile an incident report. With the developments of LLMs, building LLM-based agents for automatic thread investigation is a promising direction. To assist the development and evaluation of LLM agents, we construct a dataset from a controlled Azure tenant that covers 8 simulated real-world multi-step attacks, 57 log tables from Microsoft Sentinel and related services, and 589 automatically generated questions. We leverage security logs extracted with expert-crafted detection logic to build threat investigation graphs, and then generate questions with LLMs using paired nodes on the graph, taking the start node as background context and the end node as answer. Anchoring each question to these explicit nodes and edges not only provides automatic, explainable ground truth answers but also makes the pipeline reusable and readily extensible to new logs. This also enables the automatic generation of procedural tasks with verifiable rewards, which can be naturally extended to training agents via reinforcement learning. Our comprehensive experiments with different models confirm the difficulty of the task: with the base setting, the average reward across all evaluated models is 0.249, and the best achieved is 0.368, leaving substantial headroom for future research. Code and data are coming soon!

Verification is crucial for effective mathematical reasoning. We present a new temporal consistency method where verifiers iteratively refine their judgments based on the previous assessment. Unlike one-round verification or multi-model debate approaches, our method leverages consistency in a sequence of self-reflection actions to improve verification accuracy. Empirical evaluations across diverse mathematical process error identification benchmarks (Mathcheck, ProcessBench, and PRM800K) show consistent performance improvements over baseline methods. When applied to the recent DeepSeek R1 distilled models, our method demonstrates strong performance, enabling 7B/8B distilled models to outperform all 70B/72B models and GPT-4o on ProcessBench. Notably, the distilled 14B model with our method achieves performance comparable to Deepseek-R1. Our codes are available at https://github.com/jcguo123/Temporal-Consistency

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) improves instruction following capabilities of large language models (LLMs), but suffers from training inefficiency due to inadequate difficulty assessment. Moreover, RLVR is prone to over-optimization, where LLMs exploit verification shortcuts without aligning to the actual intent of user instructions. We introduce Instruction Following Decorator (IFDecorator}, a framework that wraps RLVR training into a robust and sample-efficient pipeline. It consists of three components: (1) a cooperative-adversarial data flywheel that co-evolves instructions and hybrid verifications, generating progressively more challenging instruction-verification pairs; (2) IntentCheck, a bypass module enforcing intent alignment; and (3) trip wires, a diagnostic mechanism that detects reward hacking via trap instructions, which trigger and capture shortcut exploitation behaviors. Our Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct-IFDecorator achieves 87.43% accuracy on IFEval, outperforming larger proprietary models such as GPT-4o. Additionally, we demonstrate substantial improvements on FollowBench while preserving general capabilities. Our trip wires show significant reductions in reward hacking rates. We will release models, code, and data for future research.

As LLM-based agents increasingly browse the web on users' behalf, a natural question arises: can websites passively identify which underlying model powers an agent? Doing so would represent a significant security risk, enabling targeted attacks tailored to known model vulnerabilities. Across 14 frontier LLMs and four web environments spanning information retrieval and shopping tasks, we show that an agent's actions and interaction timings, captured via a passive JavaScript tracker, are sufficient to identify the underlying model with up to 96\% F1. We formalise this attack surface by demonstrating that classifiers trained on agent actions generalise across model sizes and families. We further show that strong classifiers can be trained from few interaction traces and that agent identity can be inferred early within an episode. Injecting randomised timing delays between actions substantially degrades classifier performance, but does not provide robust protection: a classifier retrained on delayed traces largely recovers performance. We release our harness and a labelled corpus of agent traces https://github.com/KabakaWilliam/known_actions{here}.

LLM agents are increasingly deployed as executable systems that use tools, modify workspaces, and produce concrete artifacts. In such workflows, performance depends not only on the base model, but also on the harness: the system layer that manages context, tools, state, constraints, permissions, tracing, and recovery. However, existing benchmarks typically abstract away execution, compare complete agent systems, or hold the harness fixed, making execution-layer variation difficult to study. We introduce Harness-Bench, a diagnostic benchmark for evaluating configuration-level harness effects in realistic agent workflows. Harness-Bench evaluates representative harness configurations across multiple model backends under shared task environments, budgets, and evaluation protocols, while preserving each harness's native execution behavior. The benchmark contains 106 sandboxed offline tasks constructed from practical agent-use patterns and manually reviewed for realism, solvability, oracle-checkability, and integrity. Each run records final artifacts, execution traces, usage statistics, and validator outputs, enabling analysis beyond final completion. Across 5,194 execution trajectories, we observe substantial variation in completion, process quality, efficiency, and failure behavior across model-harness pairings. These results suggest that agent capability should be reported at the model-harness configuration level rather than attributed to the base model alone. Our analysis further identifies recurring execution-alignment failures, where plausible reasoning becomes decoupled from tool feedback, workspace state, evidence, or verifiable output contracts. Harness-Bench provides a reproducible foundation for diagnosing and improving reliable, efficient, and auditable agent execution stacks.

As Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly execute complex, autonomous software engineering tasks, developers rely on natural language instruction files such as AGENTS.md to express project-specific coding conventions, tooling restrictions, and architectural boundaries. However, because these instructions remain passive text, agents frequently violate documented constraints due to context window saturation or conflicting local context. In autonomous settings without real-time human supervision, such violations rapidly compound into technical debt. To ground autonomous agents in repository constraints, we introduce ContextCov, a framework that transforms passive natural language instructions into executable guardrails. Unlike prompt-only or reflection-only compliance approaches, ContextCov compiles documented constraints into three complementary checks: static AST queries for code patterns, runtime shell shims that intercept prohibited commands, and architectural validators that enforce structural rules. Acting as an automated, continuous reviewer, ContextCov intercepts agent actions and returns immediate, reproducible violation traces, enabling self-correction before non-compliant changes are finalized. We evaluate ContextCov on SWE-bench Lite (12 repositories, 300 tasks). Compared to prompt-only and LLM reflection baselines, ContextCov achieves 88.3% constraint compliance (vs. 67.0% and 50.3%) with 3.4x lower feedback cost, while maintaining functional correctness. The source code and evaluation results are available at https://github.com/reSHARMA/ContextCov.

Autonomous language-model agents increasingly rely on installable skills and tools to complete user tasks. Static skill auditing can expose capability surface before deployment, but it cannot determine whether a particular invocation is unsafe under the current user request and runtime context. We therefore study skill invocation auditing as a continuous-risk estimation problem: given a user request, candidate skill, and runtime context, predict a score that supports ranking and triage before a hard intervention is applied. We introduce STARS, which combines a static capability prior, a request-conditioned invocation risk model, and a calibrated risk-fusion policy. To evaluate this setting, we construct SIA-Bench, a benchmark of 3,000 invocation records with group-safe splits, lineage metadata, runtime context, canonical action labels, and derived continuous-risk targets. On a held-out split of indirect prompt injection attacks, calibrated fusion reaches 0.439 high-risk AUPRC, improving over 0.405 for the contextual scorer and 0.380 for the strongest static baseline, while the contextual scorer remains better calibrated with 0.289 expected calibration error. On the locked in-distribution test split, gains are smaller and static priors remain useful. The resulting claim is therefore narrower: request-conditioned auditing is most valuable as an invocation-time risk-scoring and triage layer rather than as a replacement for static screening. Code is available at https://github.com/123zgj123/STARS.

Background: Some developer activity traditionally performed manually, such as making code commits, opening, managing, or closing issues is increasingly subject to automation in many OSS projects. Specifically, such activity is often performed by tools that react to events or run at specific times. We refer to such automation tools as bots and, in many software mining scenarios related to developer productivity or code quality it is desirable to identify bots in order to separate their actions from actions of individuals. Aim: Find an automated way of identifying bots and code committed by these bots, and to characterize the types of bots based on their activity patterns. Method and Result: We propose BIMAN, a systematic approach to detect bots using author names, commit messages, files modified by the commit, and projects associated with the ommits. For our test data, the value for AUC-ROC was 0.9. We also characterized these bots based on the time patterns of their code commits and the types of files modified, and found that they primarily work with documentation files and web pages, and these files are most prevalent in HTML and JavaScript ecosystems. We have compiled a shareable dataset containing detailed information about 461 bots we found (all of whom have more than 1000 commits) and 13,762,430 commits they created.

LLM agents operating in open environments face escalating risks from indirect prompt injection, particularly within the tool stream where manipulated metadata and runtime feedback hijack execution flow. Existing defenses encounter a critical dilemma as advanced models prioritize injected rules due to strict alignment while static protection mechanisms sever the feedback loop required for adaptive reasoning. To reconcile this conflict, we propose VIGIL, a framework that shifts the paradigm from restrictive isolation to a verify-before-commit protocol. By facilitating speculative hypothesis generation and enforcing safety through intent-grounded verification, VIGIL preserves reasoning flexibility while ensuring robust control. We further introduce SIREN, a benchmark comprising 959 tool stream injection cases designed to simulate pervasive threats characterized by dynamic dependencies. Extensive experiments demonstrate that VIGIL outperforms state-of-the-art dynamic defenses by reducing the attack success rate by over 22\% while more than doubling the utility under attack compared to static baselines, thereby achieving an optimal balance between security and utility.

AI agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious content hijacks agent behavior to steal credentials or cause financial loss. The only known robust defense is architectural isolation that strictly separates trusted task planning from untrusted environment observations. However, applying this design to Computer Use Agents (CUAs) -- systems that automate tasks by viewing screens and executing actions -- presents a fundamental challenge: current agents require continuous observation of UI state to determine each action, conflicting with the isolation required for security. We resolve this tension by demonstrating that UI workflows, while dynamic, are structurally predictable. We introduce Single-Shot Planning for CUAs, where a trusted planner generates a complete execution graph with conditional branches before any observation of potentially malicious content, providing provable control flow integrity guarantees against arbitrary instruction injections. Although this architectural isolation successfully prevents instruction injections, we show that additional measures are needed to prevent Branch Steering attacks, which manipulate UI elements to trigger unintended valid paths within the plan. We evaluate our design on OSWorld, and retain up to 57% of the performance of frontier models while improving performance for smaller open-source models by up to 19%, demonstrating that rigorous security and utility can coexist in CUAs.

OpenClaw has rapidly established itself as a leading open-source autonomous agent runtime, offering powerful capabilities including tool integration, local file access, and shell command execution. However, these broad operational privileges introduce critical security vulnerabilities, transforming model errors into tangible system-level threats such as sensitive data leakage, privilege escalation, and malicious third-party skill execution. Existing security measures for the OpenClaw ecosystem remain highly fragmented, addressing only isolated stages of the agent lifecycle rather than providing holistic protection. To bridge this gap, we present ClawKeeper, a real-time security framework that integrates multi-dimensional protection mechanisms across three complementary architectural layers. (1) Skill-based protection operates at the instruction level, injecting structured security policies directly into the agent context to enforce environment-specific constraints and cross-platform boundaries. (2) Plugin-based protection serves as an internal runtime enforcer, providing configuration hardening, proactive threat detection, and continuous behavioral monitoring throughout the execution pipeline. (3) Watcher-based protection introduces a novel, decoupled system-level security middleware that continuously verifies agent state evolution. It enables real-time execution intervention without coupling to the agent's internal logic, supporting operations such as halting high-risk actions or enforcing human confirmation. We argue that this Watcher paradigm holds strong potential to serve as a foundational building block for securing next-generation autonomous agent systems. Extensive qualitative and quantitative evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of ClawKeeper across diverse threat scenarios. We release our code.

One of the principal challenges in building VLM-powered GUI agents is visual grounding, i.e., localizing the appropriate screen region for action execution based on both the visual content and the textual plans. Most existing work formulates this as a text-based coordinate generation task. However, these approaches suffer from several limitations: weak spatial-semantic alignment, inability to handle ambiguous supervision targets, and a mismatch between the dense nature of screen coordinates and the coarse, patch-level granularity of visual features extracted by models like Vision Transformers. In this paper, we propose GUI-Actor, a VLM-based method for coordinate-free GUI grounding. At its core, GUI-Actor introduces an attention-based action head that learns to align a dedicated <ACTOR> token with all relevant visual patch tokens, enabling the model to propose one or more action regions in a single forward pass. In line with this, we further design a grounding verifier to evaluate and select the most plausible action region from the candidates proposed for action execution. Extensive experiments show that GUI-Actor outperforms prior state-of-the-art methods on multiple GUI action grounding benchmarks, with improved generalization to unseen screen resolutions and layouts. Notably, GUI-Actor-7B even surpasses UI-TARS-72B (38.1) on ScreenSpot-Pro, achieving scores of 40.7 with Qwen2-VL and 44.6 with Qwen2.5-VL as backbones. Furthermore, by incorporating the verifier, we find that fine-tuning only the newly introduced action head (~100M parameters for 7B model) while keeping the VLM backbone frozen is sufficient to achieve performance comparable to previous state-of-the-art models, highlighting that GUI-Actor can endow the underlying VLM with effective grounding capabilities without compromising its general-purpose strengths.

Loop invariants are fundamental to reasoning about programs with loops. They establish properties about a given loop's behavior. When they additionally are inductive, they become useful for the task of formal verification that seeks to establish strong mathematical guarantees about program's runtime behavior. The inductiveness ensures that the invariants can be checked locally without consulting the entire program, thus are indispensable artifacts in a formal proof of correctness. Finding inductive loop invariants is an undecidable problem, and despite a long history of research towards practical solutions, it remains far from a solved problem. This paper investigates the capabilities of the Large Language Models (LLMs) in offering a new solution towards this old, yet important problem. To that end, we first curate a dataset of verification problems on programs with loops. Next, we design a prompt for exploiting LLMs, obtaining inductive loop invariants, that are checked for correctness using sound symbolic tools. Finally, we explore the effectiveness of using an efficient combination of a symbolic tool and an LLM on our dataset and compare it against a purely symbolic baseline. Our results demonstrate that LLMs can help improve the state-of-the-art in automated program verification.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are being increasingly used in software engineering tasks, with an increased focus on bug report resolution over the past year. However, most proposed systems fail to properly handle uncertain or incorrect inputs and outputs. Existing LLM-based tools and coding agents respond to every issue and generate a patch for every case, even when the input is vague or their own output is incorrect. There are no mechanisms in place to abstain when confidence is low. This leads to unreliable behaviour, such as hallucinated code changes or responses based on vague issue reports. We introduce BouncerBench, a benchmark that evaluates whether LLM-based software agents can refuse to act when inputs are ill-defined or refuse to respond when their own outputs are likely to be incorrect. Unlike prior benchmarks that implicitly incentivize models to generate responses even when uncertain, BouncerBench aims to improve precision by targeting two overlooked failure points: (1) vague or underspecified issue descriptions in tickets and (2) logically or functionally incorrect code patches created by the system. It measures whether proposed systems can distinguish actionable issues from vague tickets and valid patches from untrustworthy ones. We also implement a basic input and output bouncer, evaluating how well current LLMs can abstain when needed. Our results show that most models fail to abstain from underspecified inputs or incorrect outputs. Hence, we conclude that there is significant room for improvement before LLMs can be trusted to make correct decisions and recommendations in real-world software engineering workflows. BouncerBench provides a first step toward evaluating and building more cautious, trustworthy code agents. The replication package, dataset, and leaderboard can be found at bouncerbench.com

We consider the task of mapping pseudocode to long programs that are functionally correct. Given test cases as a mechanism to validate programs, we search over the space of possible translations of the pseudocode to find a program that passes the validation. However, without proper credit assignment to localize the sources of program failures, it is difficult to guide search toward more promising programs. We propose to perform credit assignment based on signals from compilation errors, which constitute 88.7% of program failures. Concretely, we treat the translation of each pseudocode line as a discrete portion of the program, and whenever a synthesized program fails to compile, an error localization method tries to identify the portion of the program responsible for the failure. We then focus search over alternative translations of the pseudocode for those portions. For evaluation, we collected the SPoC dataset (Search-based Pseudocode to Code) containing 18,356 programs with human-authored pseudocode and test cases. Under a budget of 100 program compilations, performing search improves the synthesis success rate over using the top-one translation of the pseudocode from 25.6% to 44.7%.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in visuomotor control, yet ensuring their robustness in unstructured real-world environments remains a persistent challenge. In this paper, we investigate test-time scaling through the lens of sampling and verification as means to enhance the robustness and generalization of VLAs. We first demonstrate that the relationship between action error and the number of generated samples follows an exponentiated power law across a range of VLAs, indicating the existence of inference-time scaling laws. Building on these insights, we introduce RoboMonkey, a test-time scaling framework for VLAs. At deployment, RoboMonkey samples a small set of actions from a VLA, applies Gaussian perturbation and majority voting to construct an action proposal distribution, and then uses a Vision Language Model (VLM)-based verifier to select the optimal action. We propose a synthetic data generation pipeline for training such VLM-based action verifiers, and demonstrate that scaling the synthetic dataset consistently improves verification and downstream accuracy. Through extensive simulated and hardware experiments, we show that pairing existing VLAs with RoboMonkey yields significant performance gains, achieving a 25% absolute improvement on out-of-distribution tasks and 9% on in-distribution tasks. Additionally, when adapting to new robot setups, we show that fine-tuning both VLAs and action verifiers yields a 7% performance increase compared to fine-tuning VLAs alone.

Action models are essential for enabling autonomous agents to perform complex tasks. However, training large action models remains challenging due to the diversity of agent environments and the complexity of agentic data. Despite growing interest, existing infrastructure provides limited support for scalable, agent-specific fine-tuning. We present ActionStudio, a lightweight and extensible data and training framework designed for large action models. ActionStudio unifies heterogeneous agent trajectories through a standardized format, supports diverse training paradigms including LoRA, full fine-tuning, and distributed setups, and integrates robust preprocessing and verification tools. We validate its effectiveness across both public and realistic industry benchmarks, demonstrating strong performance and practical scalability. We open-sourced code and data at https://github.com/SalesforceAIResearch/xLAM to facilitate research in the community.

Automatically generating formal specifications could reduce the effort needed to improve program correctness, but in practice, this is still challenging. Many developers avoid writing contracts by hand, which limits the use of automated verification tools. Recent large language models (LLMs) can generate specifications from code, but these specifications often fail in terms of verification. The reason is syntax errors, overly strict constraints, or mismatches with program behavior. We present SpecPylot, a Python tool that synthesizes executable specifications for Python programs as icontract annotations and checks them using crosshair's symbolic execution. The tool relies on LLMs to propose candidate contracts and uses crosshair to validate them. When crosshair finds a concrete counterexample, SpecPylot updates only the generated contracts and leaves the program itself untouched. In addition, the tool can produce coverage-driven pytest stubs and keep detailed execution artifacts that are useful during debugging. Overall, the evaluation indicates that SpecPylot is able to generate crosshair-compatible contracts for most programs, but it also highlights the practical limits introduced by bounded symbolic exploration and differences in LLM behavior.

Answer verification methods are widely employed in language model training pipelines spanning data curation, evaluation, and reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR). While prior work focus on developing unified verifiers applicable across multiple reasoning scenarios, significant challenges remain in computation-oriented scientific domains, such as algebraic equivalence checking and physical constant substitution. In this paper, we introduce \model, a tool-augmented verifier that leverages external executors to perform precise computations and symbolic simplifications. \model enables robust verification that goes beyond simple semantic matching. We propose a novel two-stage pipeline, which begin with cold-start fine-tuning and followed by multi-turn reinforcement learning with tool integration. Extensive experiments conducted on STEM subjects, general QA, and long-form reasoning tasks demonstrates strong generalization of \model. The results shows that the \model achieves state-of-the-art performance on VerifyBench-Hard and SCI-Bench. And we also employ our \model in RLVR as a reward model, the results show that it consistently outperforms both rubric-based and model-based verifiers on AIME'24 and AIME'25, demonstrating strong potential to enhance reasoning capabilities of LLM. Our model is released at https://huggingface.co/Nanbeige/CoSineVerifier-Tool-4B{https://huggingface.co/Nanbeige/CoSineVerifier-Tool-4B}.

Interactive agent benchmarks face a tension between scalable construction and realistic workflow evaluation. Hand-authored tasks are expensive to extend and revise, while static prompt evaluation misses failures that only appear when agents operate over persistent state. Existing interactive benchmarks have advanced agent evaluation significantly, but most initialize tasks from clean state and do not systematically test how agents handle pre-existing partial, stale, or conflicting artifacts. We present ClawForge, a generator-backed benchmark framework for executable command-line workflows under state conflict. The framework compiles scenario templates, grounded slots, initialized state, reference trajectories, and validators into reproducible task specifications, and evaluates agents step by step over persistent workflow surfaces using normalized end state and observable side effects rather than exact trajectory matching. We instantiate this framework as the ClawForge-Bench (17 scenarios, 6 ability categories). Results across seven frontier models show that the best model reaches only 45.3% strict accuracy, wrong-state replacement remains below 17\% for all models, and the widest model separation (17% to 90%) is driven by whether agents inspect existing state before acting. Partial-credit and step-efficiency analyses further reveal that many failures are near-miss closures rather than early breakdowns, and that models exhibit qualitatively different failure styles under state conflict.

Agent skills, structured procedural knowledge packages injected at inference time, are increasingly used to augment LLM agents on software engineering tasks. However, their real utility in end-to-end development settings remains unclear. We present SWE-Skills-Bench, the first requirement-driven benchmark that isolates the marginal utility of agent skills in real-world software engineering (SWE). It pairs 49 public SWE skills with authentic GitHub repositories pinned at fixed commits and requirement documents with explicit acceptance criteria, yielding approximately 565 task instances across six SWE subdomains. We introduce a deterministic verification framework that maps each task's acceptance criteria to execution-based tests, enabling controlled paired evaluation with and without the skill. Our results show that skill injection benefits are far more limited than rapid adoption suggests: 39 of 49 skills yield zero pass-rate improvement, and the average gain is only +1.2%. Token overhead varies from modest savings to a 451% increase while pass rates remain unchanged. Only seven specialized skills produce meaningful gains (up to +30%), while three degrade performance (up to -10%) due to version-mismatched guidance conflicting with project context. These findings suggest that agent skills are a narrow intervention whose utility depends strongly on domain fit, abstraction level, and contextual compatibility. SWE-Skills-Bench provides a testbed for evaluating the design, selection, and deployment of skills in software engineering agents. SWE-Skills-Bench is available at https://github.com/GeniusHTX/SWE-Skills-Bench.

The demonstrated code-understanding capability of LLMs raises the question of whether they can be used for automated program verification, a task that often demands high-level abstract reasoning about program properties, which is challenging for verification tools. We propose a general methodology to combine the power of LLMs and automated reasoners for automated program verification. We formally describe this methodology as a set of derivation rules and prove its soundness. We instantiate the calculus as a sound automated verification procedure, which led to practical improvements on a set of synthetic and competition benchmarks.

We present EgoExo-Fitness, a new full-body action understanding dataset, featuring fitness sequence videos recorded from synchronized egocentric and fixed exocentric (third-person) cameras. Compared with existing full-body action understanding datasets, EgoExo-Fitness not only contains videos from first-person perspectives, but also provides rich annotations. Specifically, two-level temporal boundaries are provided to localize single action videos along with sub-steps of each action. More importantly, EgoExo-Fitness introduces innovative annotations for interpretable action judgement--including technical keypoint verification, natural language comments on action execution, and action quality scores. Combining all of these, EgoExo-Fitness provides new resources to study egocentric and exocentric full-body action understanding across dimensions of "what", "when", and "how well". To facilitate research on egocentric and exocentric full-body action understanding, we construct benchmarks on a suite of tasks (i.e., action classification, action localization, cross-view sequence verification, cross-view skill determination, and a newly proposed task of guidance-based execution verification), together with detailed analysis. Code and data will be available at https://github.com/iSEE-Laboratory/EgoExo-Fitness/tree/main.

Deterministic pre-execution safety gates evaluate whether individual agent actions are compatible with their assigned roles. While effective at per-action authorization, these systems are structurally blind to distributed attacks that decompose harmful intent across multiple individually-compliant steps. This paper introduces Session Risk Memory (SRM), a lightweight deterministic module that extends stateless execution gates with trajectory-level authorization. SRM maintains a compact semantic centroid representing the evolving behavioral profile of an agent session and accumulates a risk signal through exponential moving average over baseline-subtracted gate outputs. It operates on the same semantic vector representation as the underlying gate, requiring no additional model components, training, or probabilistic inference. We evaluate SRM on a multi-turn benchmark of 80 sessions containing slow-burn exfiltration, gradual privilege escalation, and compliance drift scenarios. Results show that ILION+SRM achieves F1 = 1.0000 with 0% false positive rate, compared to stateless ILION at F1 = 0.9756 with 5% FPR, while maintaining 100% detection rate for both systems. Critically, SRM eliminates all false positives with a per-turn overhead under 250 microseconds. The framework introduces a conceptual distinction between spatial authorization consistency (evaluated per action) and temporal authorization consistency (evaluated over trajectory), providing a principled basis for session-level safety in agentic systems.

Predicting program behavior without execution is an essential and challenging task in software engineering. Traditional models often struggle to capture dynamic dependencies and interactions within code. This paper introduces a novel machine learning-based framework called CodeFlowrepresents, which predicts code coverage and detects runtime errors through Dynamic Dependencies Learning. Utilizing control flow graphs (CFGs), CodeFlowrepresents all possible execution paths and the relationships between different statements, offering a comprehensive understanding of program behavior. It constructs CFGs to depict execution paths and learns vector representations for CFG nodes, capturing static control-flow dependencies. Additionally, it learns dynamic dependencies through execution traces, which reflect the impacts among statements during execution. This approach enables accurate prediction of code coverage and identification of runtime errors. Empirical evaluations show significant improvements in code coverage prediction accuracy and effective localization of runtime errors, surpassing current models.

Agent benchmarks score submissions with outcome verifiers that are typically hand-written and brittle, leaving them open to reward hacking. We audit 1,968 tasks across five terminal-agent benchmarks and find 323 (16%) hackable by frontier models given only the task description. This corrupts both leaderboard rankings and RL training signal, yet the standard response is manual and reactive. We introduce the hacker-fixer loop, a method for building exploit-resistant verifiers without per-task manual patching. The loop alternates three LLM agents: a hacker tries to pass the verifier without solving the task, a fixer patches the verifier to reject each discovered exploit, and a solver confirms the patched verifier still admits legitimate solutions. The loop iterates: each patch reshapes what the verifier rewards, surfacing the next exploit. We further add verifier access, and let patches transfer across tasks, to broaden the exploits the loop discovers. On KernelBench, the loop drives the attack success rate from 62% to 0% on a held-out corpus of publicly reported exploits. We also find that weaker agents in the loop can defend against much stronger hackers: Gemini 3 Flash's loop drives the stronger Gemini 3.1 Pro and Claude Opus 4.7's attack success rate from 76% and 61% to 0% on KernelBench, and Gemini 3.1 Pro's from 39% to 17% on Terminal Bench across 77 tasks. We release Terminal Wrench (323 hackable environments, 3,632 hack trajectories) as a snapshot of the current attack surface, our patched verifiers, the exploits the loop discovered, and our implementation as a basis for future work.

Large language models (LLMs) can generate plausible code but offer limited guarantees of correctness. Formally verifying that implementations satisfy specifications requires constructing machine-checkable proofs, a task that remains beyond current automation. We propose a hierarchical proof search framework for automated code verification in Lean~4 that decomposes complex verification goals into structurally simpler subgoals before attempting tactic-level proving. Central to our approach is a principled decomposition score that combines constructive justification with structural effectiveness. Crucially, this score serves as both the training reward and the inference-time ranking criterion, ensuring strict alignment between optimization and deployment. We train Goedel-Code-Prover-8B, a single unified policy for both decomposition and completion, via supervised initialization followed by hybrid reinforcement learning, where a continuous decomposition reward drives planning exploration while supervised replay stabilizes proof generation. On three Lean-based code verification benchmarks comprising 427 tasks, our 8B-parameter model achieves a 62.0\% prove success rate, a 2.6times improvement over the strongest baseline, surpassing neural provers up to 84times larger. We further observe consistent inference-time scaling: success rates improve monotonically with search iterations and sampling budget, with our trained model achieving greater efficiency than frontier off-the-shelf models of comparable scale.

Modern CI/CD pipelines integrating agent-generated code exhibit a structural failure in responsibility attribution. Decisions are executed through formally correct approval processes, yet no entity possesses both the authority to approve those decisions and the epistemic capacity to meaningfully understand their basis. We define this condition as responsibility vacuum: a state in which decisions occur, but responsibility cannot be attributed because authority and verification capacity do not coincide. We show that this is not a process deviation or technical defect, but a structural property of deployments where decision generation throughput exceeds bounded human verification capacity. We identify a scaling limit under standard deployment assumptions, including parallel agent generation, CI-based validation, and individualized human approval gates. Beyond a throughput threshold, verification ceases to function as a decision criterion and is replaced by ritualized approval based on proxy signals. Personalized responsibility becomes structurally unattainable in this regime. We further characterize a CI amplification dynamic, whereby increasing automated validation coverage raises proxy signal density without restoring human capacity. Under fixed time and attention constraints, this accelerates cognitive offloading in the broad sense and widens the gap between formal approval and epistemic understanding. Additional automation therefore amplifies, rather than mitigates, the responsibility vacuum. We conclude that unless organizations explicitly redesign decision boundaries or reassign responsibility away from individual decisions toward batch- or system-level ownership, responsibility vacuum remains an invisible but persistent failure mode in scaled agent deployments.

Obtaining reliable feedback from the environment is a fundamental capability for intelligent agents to evaluate the correctness of their actions and to accumulate reusable knowledge. However, most existing approaches rely on predefined measurements or fixed reward signals, which limits their applicability in open-ended and dynamic environments where new actions may require previously unknown forms of feedback. To address these limitations, this paper proposes an Actively Feedback Getting model, in which an AI agent proactively interacts with the environment to discover, screen, and verify feedback without relying on predefined measurements. Rather than assuming explicit feedback definitions, the proposed method exploits action-induced environmental differences to identify target feedback that is not specified in advance, based on the observation that actions inevitably produce measurable changes in the environment. In addition, a self-triggering mechanism, driven by internal objectives such as improved accuracy, precision, and efficiency, is introduced to autonomously plan and adjust actions, thereby enabling faster and more focused feedback acquisition without external commands. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed active approach significantly improves the efficiency and robustness of factor identification.

Reasoning over heterogeneous artifacts (PDFs, spreadsheets, slide decks, etc.) increasingly occurs within structured agent workflows that iteratively extract, transform, and reference external information. In these workflows, uncertainty is not merely an input-quality issue: it can redirect decomposition and routing decisions, reshape intermediate state, and produce qualitatively different execution trajectories. We study this phenomenon by treating uncertainty as a controlled variable: we inject structured perturbations into artifact-derived representations, execute fixed workflows under comprehensive logging, and quantify contamination via trace divergence in plans, tool invocations, and intermediate state. Across 614 paired runs on 32 GAIA tasks with three different language models, we find a decoupling: workflows may diverge substantially yet recover correct answers, or remain structurally similar while producing incorrect outputs. We characterize three manifestation types: silent semantic corruption, behavioral detours with recovery, and combined structural disruption and their control-flow signatures (rerouting, extended execution, early termination). We measure operational costs and characterize why commonly used verification guardrails fail to intercept contamination. We contribute (i) a formal taxonomy of contamination manifestations in structured workflows, (ii) a trace-based measurement framework for detecting and localizing contamination across agent interactions, and (iii) empirical evidence with implications for targeted verification, defensive design, and cost control.

Computer-using agents powered by Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have demonstrated human-like capabilities in operating digital environments like mobile platforms. While these agents hold great promise for advancing digital automation, their potential for unsafe operations, such as system compromise and privacy leakage, is raising significant concerns. Detecting these safety concerns across the vast and complex operational space of mobile environments presents a formidable challenge that remains critically underexplored. To establish a foundation for mobile agent safety research, we introduce MobileRisk-Live, a dynamic sandbox environment accompanied by a safety detection benchmark comprising realistic trajectories with fine-grained annotations. Built upon this, we propose OS-Sentinel, a novel hybrid safety detection framework that synergistically combines a Formal Verifier for detecting explicit system-level violations with a VLM-based Contextual Judge for assessing contextual risks and agent actions. Experiments show that OS-Sentinel achieves 10%-30% improvements over existing approaches across multiple metrics. Further analysis provides critical insights that foster the development of safer and more reliable autonomous mobile agents.

AI agents are increasingly expected to complete long-horizon workflows that require sustained progress over hours, millions of tokens, and complex environments. Yet current agent benchmarks largely evaluate short-form tasks, such as single pull requests, small tickets, or 5-10 minute exercises, limiting our ability to measure agents' capabilities in planning, long-context understanding, and memory use. We introduce SWE-Marathon, a benchmark of 20 long-horizon tasks spanning software engineering and adjacent technical domains. Each task consists of a unique executable environment, a human-written reference solution, and a multi-layer verification suite. Logged agent attempts average 27.2M total tokens, making SWE-Marathon substantially longer-horizon than existing SWE and command-line agent benchmarks. Current frontier coding agents solve fewer than 30% of tasks. Failures often arise from poor self-verification, self-reported infeasibility, and premature termination. We also observe reward-hacking behavior in 13.8% of rollouts, where agents attempt to exploit the environment or verifier to bypass the intended workflow. SWE-Marathon includes adversarial review of test suites and execution environments, as well as multi-layer checks designed to prevent shortcut solutions. We release SWE-Marathon, evaluation code, and agent trajectories at https://swe-marathon.org/.

While LLM-based agents can interact with environments via invoking external tools, their expanded capabilities also amplify security risks. Monitoring step-level tool invocation behaviors in real time and proactively intervening before unsafe execution is critical for agent deployment, yet remains under-explored. In this work, we first construct TS-Bench, a novel benchmark for step-level tool invocation safety detection in LLM agents. We then develop a guardrail model, TS-Guard, using multi-task reinforcement learning. The model proactively detects unsafe tool invocation actions before execution by reasoning over the interaction history. It assesses request harmfulness and action-attack correlations, producing interpretable and generalizable safety judgments and feedback. Furthermore, we introduce TS-Flow, a guardrail-feedback-driven reasoning framework for LLM agents, which reduces harmful tool invocations of ReAct-style agents by 65 percent on average and improves benign task completion by approximately 10 percent under prompt injection attacks.

We introduce QualityFlow, a dynamic agentic workflow for program synthesis. Given the English description of a programming problem and a set of unit tests, the model's goal is to synthesize the correct program that solves the problem and passes the tests. QualityFlow includes large language model (LLM) agents resembling a software development team, including code generation, testing, and self-debugging. We propose the LLM Quality Checker, which explicitly "imagines" whether the synthesized programs' execution would conform to the unit tests. The Quality Checks dynamically control the workflow, including actions to submit the final answer, clarify the problem statement, and revert previous workflow steps. Our experiments show that the Quality Checker can precisely accept any correct program, mitigate faulty synthesized tests, and prevent potential workflow deviation. QualityFlow establishes the state-of-the-art results on four program synthesis benchmarks: MBPP, HumanEval, and stricter evaluations from MBPP-EvalPlus and HumanEval-EvalPlus.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models map multimodal perception and language instructions to executable robot actions, making them particularly vulnerable to behavioral backdoor manipulation: a hidden trigger introduced during training can induce unintended physical actions while nominal task performance remains intact. Prior work on VLA backdoors primarily studies untargeted attacks or task-level hijacking, leaving fine-grained control over individual actions largely unexplored. In this work, we present DropVLA, an action-level backdoor attack that forces a reusable action primitive (e.g., open_gripper) to execute at attacker-chosen decision points under a realistic pipeline-black-box setting with limited data-poisoning access, using a window-consistent relabeling scheme for chunked fine-tuning. On OpenVLA-7B evaluated with LIBERO, vision-only poisoning achieves 98.67%-99.83% attack success rate (ASR) with only 0.31% poisoned episodes while preserving 98.50%-99.17% clean-task retention, and successfully triggers the targeted action within 25 control steps at 500 Hz (0.05 s). Text-only triggers are unstable at low poisoning budgets, and combining text with vision provides no consistent ASR improvement over vision-only attacks. The backdoor remains robust to moderate trigger variations and transfers across evaluation suites (96.27%, 99.09%), whereas text-only largely fails (0.72%). We further validate physical-world feasibility on a 7-DoF Franka arm with pi0-fast, demonstrating non-trivial attack efficacy under camera-relative motion that induces image-plane trigger drift. These results reveal that VLA models can be covertly steered at the granularity of safety-critical actions with minimal poisoning and without observable degradation of nominal performance.

Multimodal agents are increasingly expected to operate interfaces on behalf of users, raising a central deployment question: can they truly substitute for humans in workflows that services deliberately protect against automation? CAPTCHA verification makes this question concrete. It is not merely a visual puzzle, but a human-verification boundary placed before account creation, content access, form submission, and other protected actions. We introduce Humanity's Last Line of Verification (HLL), a controlled benchmark that uses interactive CAPTCHA verification to evaluate whether agents can cross this boundary through grounded, human-like interaction rather than recognition alone. HLL covers diverse CAPTCHA interactions and exposes agents to controlled realism stressors, including cluttered webpages, harder task variants, and trace-conditioned validation of the solving process. We evaluate eight frontier multimodal agents in a closed-loop GUI environment. The results show that current agents remain brittle at this human-substitution boundary: performance varies sharply across verification types, degrades under realistic interface conditions, and drops further when correct answers must be supported by valid action traces. By exposing gaps in localization, action calibration, state tracking, and process consistency, HLL provides a concrete testbed for measuring how close multimodal agents are to acting as human substitutes in protected real-world workflows. Our code is available at https://github.com/XinhaoS0101/HLL